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Abstract 
This paper addresses the logical foundations of goal-regression planning in autonomous rational 
agents. It focuses mainly on three problems. The lirst is that goals and subgoals will often be 
conjunctions, and to apply goal-regression planning to a conjunction we usually have to plan 
separately for the conjuncts and then combine the resulting subplans. A logical problem arises 
from the fact that the subplans may destructively interfere with each other. This problem has been 
partially solved in the AI literature (e.g., in SNLP and UCPOP), but the solutions proposed there 
work only when a restrictive assumption is satisfied. This assumption pertains to the computability 
of threats. It is argued that this assumption may fail for an autonomous rational agent operating in a 
complex environment. Relaxing this assumption leads to a theory of defeasible planning. The theory 
is formulated precisely and an implementation in the OSCAR architecture is discussed. 
The second problem is that goal-regression planning proceeds in terms of reasoning that runs 
afoul of the Frame Problem. It is argued that a previously proposed solution to the Frame Problem 
legitimizes goal-regression planning, but also has the consequence that some restrictions must be 
imposed on the logical form of goals and subgoals amenable to such planning. These restrictions 
have to do with temporal-projectibility. 
The third problem is that the theory of goal-regression planning found in the AI literature imposes 
restrictive syntactical constraints on goals and subgoals and on the relation of logical consequence. 
Relaxing these restrictions leads to a generalization of the notion of a threat, related to collective 
defeat in defeasible reasoning. Relaxing the restrictions also has the consequence that the previously 
adequate definition of “expectable-result” no longer guarantees closure under logical consequence, 
and must be revised accordingly. That in turn leads to the need for an additional rule for goal- 
regression planning. Roughly, the rule allows us to plan for the achievement of a goal by searching 
for plans that will achieve states that “cause” the goal. Such a rule was not previously necessary, but 
becomes necessary when the syntactical constraints are relaxed. 
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The final result is a general semantics for goal-regression planning and a set of procedures that is 
provably sound and complete. It is shown that this semantics can easily handle concurrent actions, 
quantified preconditions and effects, creation and destruction of objects, and causal connections 
embodying complex temporal relationships. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses some logical problems that arise in the course of formulating 
a theory of plan construction for autonomous rational agents operating in realistically 
complex environments. My ultimate objective is to understand how truly intelligent agents 
can get around in the real world. I approach the theory of plan construction as part of 
an attempt to construct a general theory of rational cognition in such agents. Within 
rational cognition we can distinguish between epistemic cognition and practical cognition. 
Epistemic cognition is concerned with what to believe, and practical cognition is concerned 
with what to do. We can think of practical cognition as dividing roughly into four parts: 
(1) goal adoption, (2) plan construction, (3) plan adoption, (4) plan execution. Viewing 
plan construction from this somewhat broader perspective turns out to impose constraints 
not satisfied by standard planning systems. These constraints generate logical problems 
for a theory of plan construction, and the purpose of this paper is to formulate some 
of those problems precisely and propose solutions to them. The focus of this paper will 
be theoretical, however, the ultimate intent is to implement the theory in the OSCAR 
architecture for rational agents. 2 This has been partially accomplished to date. I will say 
more about implementation as the theory develops. 
In this paper, I am not particularly interested in constructing a theory of human 
cognition. However, humans are the most successful autonomous rational agents that we 
know about, and so it will be occasionally useful to reflect upon how humans solve some 
of the problems that face all autonomous rational agents. Human plan construction is 
generally based on goal-regression planning. The basic idea is a simple one, going back 
at least to Aristotle. To achieve a goal, we consider an action that would achieve it under 
some specified circumstances, and then try to find a way of putting ourselves in those 
circumstances in order to achieve the goal by performing the action. Rutting ourselves in 
those circumstances becomes a subgoal. The idea is to work backwards from the goal 
through subgoals until we arrive at subgoals that are already achieved. The resulting 
sequence of actions constitutes a plan for achieving the goal. My ultimate objective in 
this paper is to provide precise logical foundations for goal-regression planning. 
Much work in AI has been directed at the task of formalizing and automating goal- 
regression planning. This forms the basis of a large part of AI planning theory, and the 
result is what I will refer to as the “conventional” theory of goal-regression planning. In 
Section 2 I will give a precise formulation of the conventional theory. The ideas developed 
in that section will mostly be familiar, although there may be some novelty in the way in 
which I have combined familiar ideas and developed them into a logically precise theory. 
* Pollock [34]. 
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In Section 3 I will argue that, assuming the basic correctness of the conventional theory, ra- 
tional agents situated in a complex environment cannot in general perform goal-regression 
planning in quite the way the conventional theory proposes to implement it. In a sense to 
be explained, planning must be done defeasibly rather than by running a semi-decidable 
algorithm. Section 4 will describe how that can be done. In Section 5 I will argue that, 
even given the modifications of Section 4, the conventional theory turns upon an indefen- 
sible assumption. In effect, the conventional theory runs afoul of the Frame Problem. In 
Section 6 1 will show how the conventional theory must be modified in light of Section 5. 
In Sections 7 and 8 I will suggest further modifications aimed at relaxing the syntactical 
constraints the conventional theory imposes on goals and subgoals and on the relation of 
logical consequence. The final result is a general semantics for goal-regression planning 
and a set of procedures that is provably sound and complete. The short closing sections 
illustrate the power of this semantics by showing that it can easily handle concurrent ac- 
tions, quantified preconditions and effects, creation and destruction of objects, and causal 
connections embodying complex temporal relationships and metric time. 
2. The conventional theory of goal-regression planning 
Goal-regression planning is based upon conditionals to the effect that if an action A 
is performed under circumstances C, the goal G will be achieved. I will write such a 
conditional as “(A/C) l G”. I will refer to C as the precondirion of the conditional, A as 
the action, and G as the goal. For the time being, I will not attempt o be more precise about 
the logical form of these conditionals. That is a topic to which I will return in Section 5. 
I will call these planning-connirional. In goal-regression planning, human beings make 
explicit appeal to planning-conditionals. By contrast, most work in AI planning theory 
follows the lead of STRIPS [lo] in building these conditionals into the actions from which 
the plans are constructed (the “plan operators”) instead of storing them in a separate 
database of background information from which a planner reasons explicitly. Allowing 
multiple planning-conditionals concerning the same action is equivalent to employing plan 
operators with conditional effects. ’ 
Goal-regression planning aims to construct a plan for achieving a goal. But what exactly 
is a plan? Plans are constructed out of plan-steps, which prescribe actions. Plan-steps 
cannot be identified with the actions they prescribe, because the same action may be 
prescribed by more than one step in a single plan. The plan-steps must be executed in 
a proper order, so I will take a plan to include both the set of plan-steps and the ordering of 
the plan-steps. 
In constructing a plan, we must keep track of the purpose of each plan-step. A plan- 
step is included in a plan for the purpose of achieving some particular subgoal (or the 
ultimate goal of the plan). Subgoals, in turn, are adopted for the purpose of achieving other 
subgoals (or the ultimate goal) 6~ performing a specific action (executing a specific plan- 
step). Causal-links, introduced by McAllester and Rosenblitt [24], provide a convenient 
mechanism for recording these purposes. In the simplest case, I will take a causal-link to 
3 Conditional effects are discussed by Pednault 1271. and were first implemented in UCPOP [28J 
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have the form “no -+ subgoal + n2 + goal”, where II I and n2 are plan-steps. This causal- 
link encodes the information that step 1z1 is intended to achieve subgoal, whose purpose 
is to (partially) enable step n2 to achieve goal. The function of the set of causal-links in 
a plan is essentially explanatory. It keeps track of why the plan was built in the way it 
was. This explanatory structure is useful both in constructing the plan in the first place and 
in repairing the plan if, in the course of plan execution, things do not go as planned, i.e., 
a plan-step fails to achieve its objective. In the general case, I will allow causal-links to 
have the form nl + subgoal, -+ ... + subgoal,, -+ n2 --+ goal1 -+ ... + goal,,,, where 
subgoal,, . . , subgoal,, and goal,, . . . , goal,,, are finite sequences of subgoals and goals. 
A sublink of the form goal1 + goal2 in a causal-link signifies that goal, participates in 
establishing goal2 without a further action being required. For now there will be just one 
way in which this happens. goal2 can be a conjunction and goal1 one of its conjuncts. 
In Section 7, other possibilities will be introduced. These causal-links are more complex 
than those employed in familiar planners like SNLP [24] or UCPOP [28], which just have 
the form nl -+ subgoal, -+ n2. The additional complexity is unnecessary for their use in 
constructing plans, but it is convenient to include it for the purpose of proving theorems 
about plans. 
In order to use causal-links to record the purposes of plan-steps and subgoals, two 
special cases must be accommodated. A subgoal might already be true, in which case 
it is not established by any step of the plan. In order to record this with a causal-link, 
it is convenient to add a “dummy step” * start*, which precedes all other steps in the 
plan and does not itself prescribe an action. We can then have causal-links of the form 
*start* + subgoal1 + . . . -+ subgoal,, + n 1 + goal1 + . + goal,. The other special 
case occurs when the subgoal is the ultimate goal of the plan. In that case there is no step 
n2 for use in a causal-link. To enable ourselves to use a causal-link to record the purpose of 
n 1, we add another dummy step *finish* and then add a causal-link n 1 + goal1 + . . -+ 
goal, + *$nish* -+ goal,. For technical reasons that will be discussed below, we do not 
require *jnish* to succeed all other plan-steps. A plan will be allowed to contain “extra” 
plan-steps that do not participate in the achievement of its goal. 
In light of the preceding considerations, it is convenient to represent a plan as an ordered 
quadruple (plan-steps, causal-links, ordering, goal). Useful plans can be formulated using 
this representation, although this may be too simple a representation to accommodate some 
of our most sophisticated planning. I will discuss this in the final section. In this paper 
I will confine my attention to the logical structure of goal-regression planning aimed at 
constructing plans that can be represented in this way. 
Goal-regression planning proceeds by performing several different kinds of operations. 
Describing these operations constitutes a description of the logical structure of goal- 
regression planning. 
2.1. Null-plans 
The simplest case of goal-regression planning is the degenerate case in which the 
goal to be achieved is already true, and hence nothing needs to be done to achieve it. 
A null-plan for the goal goal is a plan with no plan-steps and the single causal-link 
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*start* -+ goal -+ *$nish* --+ goal. The degenerate case of goal-regression planning can 
be regarded as proceeding in accordance with the following operation: 
PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving goal, if goal is already true, propose a 
null-plan for achieving goal. 
Note that the action prescribed by this operation consists of proposing a plan rather than 
adopting a plan. To adopt a plan is to form the intention of executing it. To propose a plan is 
simply to make it a candidate for adoption. Not all candidates are adopted. Multiple plans 
may be found for a single goal, and some may be better than others. Typically only the best 
plan found is adopted. 
2.2. Goal regression 
The core of GOAL-REGRESSION planning consists of an operation that I will call 
“GOAL-REGRESSION". Regarding this as an operation that proposes a plan, it can be 
formulated as follows: 
GOAL-REGRESSION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving G, adopt interest in finding planning- 
conditionals (A/C) ti G having G as their consequent. Given such a conditional, adopt 
an interest in finding a plan for achieving C. If a plan subplan is proposed for achieving 
C, construct a plan by 
(1) adding a new step to the end of subplan where the new step prescribes the action 
A, 
(2) ordering the new step after all steps of subplan, and 
(3) adjusting the causal-links appropriately. 
Propose the new plan as a plan for achieving G. 
2.3. Splitting conjunctive goals 
The operations PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN and GOAL-REGRESSION do notbythemselves 
constitute a complete description of goal-regression planning. The subgoals generated by 
GOAL-REGRESSION will usually be conjunctions. For example, if my goal is to light a 
fire, I may observe that I could do so by lighting a match provided I have a match and 
1 have tinder. GOAL-REGRESSION will thus generate the conjunctive subgoal I have a 
match and I have tinder. We will generally be unable to make further progress in our plan 
construction by applying GOAL-REGRESSION once more to such a conjunctive subgoal 
(SGr & SG2). To do so would require our having a planning-conditional of the form 
(A/C) N (SGI & SG2). But it is rare that we will have a single planning-conditional like 
this that will achieve both conjuncts of a conjunctive subgoal. The most we can generally 
hope for is to have two separate planning-conditionals (A I /Cl) N SGl and (AZ/ C2) l SG2, 
which will allow us to construct separate subplans for the individual conjuncts. Given 
subplans for achieving each conjunct, we can then attempt o construct a plan for achieving 
the conjunction by merging the plans for the conjuncts. Given two plans plan1 and plan2, 
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let plant +plun2 be the plan that results from combining the plan-steps, causal-links, 
and ordering-constraints of each, with the following exception. Where Gt is the goal for 
plan, and G2 is the goal for plan2, for each causal-link n 1 -+ goal, + -+ GI + 
*finish* --+ G1 of plan, and causal-link nT + goal: + .. . + G2 + *jinish* -+ G2 
of plan2, instead of including these causal-links in plan, + plan,, we add causal-links 
nl + goal, + ... jGl-,(G1&G2)-,*~nish*-,(Gl&G2)andnT~goal;...-, 
G2 -+ (G 1 & G2) + *jinish* -+ (G 1 & G2). Then we can plan for conjunctive goals by 
using the following operation: 
SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (Gt & Gz), adopt 
interest in finding plans plan, for Gt and plan2 for Gz. If such plans are proposed, 
propose plan, +plan2 as a plan for (G 1 & G2). 
There is, however, a well-recognized logical problem for planning for conjunctive 
goals using SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL. The difficulty is that planning separately for the 
individual conjuncts can produce plans that destructively interfere with each other, in the 
sense that although the separate subplans can each be expected to achieve their goals in 
isolation, the merged plan cannot be expected to achieve both goals [6]. I will explore 
the nature of such destructive interference shortly, but before doing that let us consider 
the consequences that the possibility of destructive interference has for goal-regression 
planning about conjunctive goals. 
The fact that plan, + plan2 cannot automatically be expected to achieve (Gt & G2) 
suggests that the operation that should actually be employed in planning for conjunctive 
goalsis not SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL butrather: 
SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (Gt & G2), adopt 
interest in finding plans plan, for G 1 and plan2 for G2. If such plans are proposed 
and do not destructively inte$ere with each other, propose plan, + plan2 as a plan for 
(Gt 8~ G2). 
Conventional AI planning algorithms work in this way, ruling out the possibility of internal 
defects before proposing plans. I will argue below that this conventional AI approach 
cannot work for general-purpose goal-regression planning in autonomous rational agents, 
but before doing that I must lay some additional groundwork. 
Thedifferencebetween SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL and SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL- 
SAFELY is that the former must be viewed as a defeasible rule of practical reasoning. That 
is, if a plan is proposed on the basis of SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, the planning agent 
must be prepared to withdraw the proposal if destructive interference is subsequently 
discovered. SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL must then be supplemented with additional 
principles aimed at proposing new plans constructed on the basis of plan, + plan2 
but avoiding the interference. If instead it is proposed to base goal-regression planning 
on SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY, that principle must be made more complicated 
by building in the additional principles that aim to repair the destructive interference, 
producing something like the following: 
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SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (GI & G2), adopt 
interest in finding plans plan, for G 1 and plun2 for Gz. If such plans are proposed 
and do not destructively interfere with each other, propose planl + plan, as a plan for 
(G 1 & G2). If the plans do destructively interfere with each other, then search for a way 
of repairing plan, + plan2 so as to avoid the interference and propose that instead. 
This is vague about how to repair plans exhibiting destructive interference, but we will see 
below how to make that precise. 
In discussing the logical structure of plan repair, I will formulate the principles as 
supplementsto SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL ratherthanaddendato SPLIT-CONJUNCT~VE- 
GOAL-SAFELY, because the principles can be stated more simply that way. It should 
be clear that the principles to be described can be used in either way. I will argue 
in Section 3, however, that general-purpose goal-regression planning must be done 
defeasibly, using SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, rather than nondefeasibly, using SPLIT- 
CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY. A planner using SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL to reason 
defeasibly about plans has been constructed using the OSCAR system of defeasible 
reasoning. I will refer to it as the OSCAR planner. 4 
2.4. Partial-order plans 
Plansproducedbytheexclusiveuseof PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN, and GOAL-REGRESSION 
will automatically order their plan-steps linearly, because when a plan-step is added by 
GOAL-REGRESSION it is ordered after all the previously constructed plan-steps. Such 
a plan is a linear plan. However, when SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL is used to merge 
independent plans, the resulting plan plan, + plan2 simply combines the ordering- 
constraints of plan, and plun2. This can leave plan-steps from one of the subplans 
unordered with respect to plan-steps from the other. Such a plan is called a partial-order 
plan. 
It might be supposed that a partial-order plan is not yet a complete plan. Before we 
can execute a plan, we must decide in what order to execute the plan-steps, so it seems 
that an executable plan must be linear. But there are two reasons why it is useful to 
produce partial-order plans in the course of goal-regression planning. First, as is generally 
recognized in AI planning theory, planning is made more efficient by allowing planners 
to produce partial-order plans. 5 If a planner is required to produce linear plans, then 
when SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL is employed to merge plan, and plun2, additional 
ordering-constraints would have to be added arbitrarily. There will not in general be any 
reason to choose one set of additional ordering-constraints over another. However, as 
planning proceeds and the merged plan (with the arbitrary additional ordering-constraints) 
is extended by GOAL-REGRESSION, it may then have to be merged with other plans by 
additional applications of SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL. At that point, the arbitrarily chosen 
ordering-constraints may cause destructive interference between merged subplans, while 
’ An experimental version of the OSCAR planner can be downloaded from http://www.u.axizona.edu/-pollock. 
5 For a discussion of partial-order planning, see Weld [2X]. The matter of efficiency is addressed by Barrett and 
Weld 121. 
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a different choice of ordering-constraints would have avoided that. The planner will thus 
have to backtrack and try other ordering-constraints. It is more efficient to wait and not 
impose additional ordering-constraints until we have to. This has become known as “least- 
commitment planning” [45]. 
There is another, less familiar reason partial-order plans are to be preferred over linear 
plans produced by adding arbitrary ordering-constraints. This has to do with plan execution 
rather than plan construction. If it is inessential to the structure of a plan in what order the 
plan-steps are executed, then it may be best to wait until the time of execution to decide 
which step to execute first. The cost of executing the steps in one order rather than another 
may depend upon factors not known at the time of plan construction. For example, a plan 
for baking bread may call for turning on the oven and for retrieving the flour from the 
kitchen cabinet, but leave it undetermined which to do first. If we find ourselves standing 
next to the oven, it may best to turn on the oven first, but if we find ourselves standing next 
to the cabinet it may instead be best to retrieve the flour first. Thus we may lower the cost 
of plan execution by adopting partial-order plans rather than linear plans. 
2.5. Achieving goals 
Thus far I have relied on little more than common sense and introspection in describing 
the structure of goal-regression planning. To make further progress, and to make the notion 
of destructive interference precise, we must consider what the objective of goal-regression 
planning is supposed to be. If we can make that precise, we can use it to evaluate proposals 
for how to perform goal-regression planning. 
Presumably, the objective of goal-regression planning is to produce plans that will 
achieve their goals. Under what circumstances will a plan achieve its goal? Contemporary 
AI planning theory is based upon a particular answer to this question. First consider 
partial-order plans. A linear-ization of a partial-order plan is a linear plan that results from 
adding additional ordering-constraints sufficient to linearly order the plan-steps preceding 
*jinish*. To adopt a partial-order plan is to be indifferent between its various linearizations. 
Accordingly, we should define: 
A partial-order plan will achieve its goal iff every linearization of it will achieve its 
goal. 
Under what circumstances will a linear plan achieve its goal? The standard answer’ to 
this question proceeds in terms of the technical notion of a “result of an action-sequence”. 
To make the standard answer work, we must also make some assumptions. The assump- 
tions are (1) that goals are always literals7 or conjunctions of literals, and (2) that in a 
planning-conditional (A/C) w P, C and P are either literals or finite conjunctions of liter- 
als. The relaxation of these assumptions will be discussed in Section 6. Where P is atomic, 
it will be convenient to identify QN P with P, so that the negation of a literal is a literal. 
Let us take an action-sequence to be a linear sequence of actions. Given an action- 
sequence (A 1, . . , A,), define: 
6 This is implicit in both the situation calculus [25] and ADL 1271. 
7 A literal is either an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic formula 
(RI) 
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Where start-state is a state of affairs and conditionals is a set of planning- 
conditionals, P is a result of (AI, . . . A,,) relative to start-state and conditionals 
iff either: 
(i) n = 0 and P is true in start-state; or 
(ii) n > 0 and conditionals contains a conditional (A,/C) l P such that C is a 
resultof(Al,...,A,_1);8 or 
(iii) n > 0, P is a result of (Al, . , A,,_l), and conditionals does not contain a 
conditional of the form (A,/C) l -Q such that Q is either P or a conjunct 
ofPandCisaresultof(Al,...,A,_i);or 
(iv) n > 0 and P is a conjunction whose conjuncts are results of (A 1, . . , A,). 
In other words, P is a result of an action-sequence iff either P is made true by the final 
step of the action-sequence in accordance with a planning-conditional whose precondition 
is a result of the preceding subsequence of the action-sequence, or an initial segment of the 
action-sequence makes P true and subsequent actions in the sequence do not reverse that. 
Let us define: 
A plan is sound relative to a state start-state and a set of planning-conditionals iff for 
every linearization of the plan its goal is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed 
by all of its plan-steps between *start* and *Jinish*, relative to start-state and the set 
of planning-conditionals. 
Conventional AI planning theory makes the following assumption: 
Soundness Assumption. A linear plan will achieve its goal relative to a state start-state 
iff it is sound relative to start-state and the set of all true planning-conditionals. 
For the moment, let us follow AI planning theory in assuming this. I will return to the 
evaluation of the Soundness Assumption in Section 4. 
The Soundness Assumption provides the mathematical basis for a complete theory of 
goal-regression planning. As I will now show, it enables us to prove the correctness of a 
recursive characterization of plans that will achieve their goals. The steps of the recursion 
are formulated to correspond to procedures of plan construction used in goal-regression 
planning. The end result is a proof that when goal-regression planning is performed in 
accordance with certain rules, the plans it produces will achieve their goals, and if there is 
a plan that will achieve a particular goal, some such plan will be found by following these 
rules of goal-regression plannin g. So this will be a kind of soundness and completeness 
proof for goal-regression planning. 
Let us define: 
A plan is presumptively-sound relative to a set conditionals of planning-conditionals 
and a state start-state iff 
(1) where goal is the goal of the plan, the plan contains a causal-link nl -+ 
subgoal, -_, . . . -+ subgoal,, + goal + *jinish* + goal, and 
s I assume here if (A/C) l (P & Q) is in of 
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(2) for every causal-link IZ 1 + subgoall -_, . -+ suhgoul, + n2 + goal, -+ -+ 
goal, of the plan: 
(a) if II # 1, then for each i such that 1 < i < n, subgoali+, is a conjunction, 
subgoali is one of its conjuncts, and the plan also contains a causal-link nT + 
subgouq + . . . + snbgoaq + subgOUli+l + . ’ + subgoal, + n; + 
goal, + . . . + goal, where subgoal; is the other conjunct of sUbgouli+, ;
(b) if m # 1, then for each i such that 1 < i c m, goali+, is a conjunction, 
goali is one of its conjuncts, and the plan also contains a causal-link 
nT + subgoal, + ... + subgoal,, -+ nz + goal; -F ... --+ ... + goal; 
~ goali+, ~ ’ ’ ’ -+ goal, where goal; is the other conjunct of goali+, ; 
(c) if nl = *start* then subgoal, is true in start-state; 
(d) if n2 # *finish* then if A is the action of n2, “(Alsnbgoul,) N goal,” is a 
member of conditionals; 
(e) if n 1 N *start* then the plan contains a causal-link nx --+ subgoal? -+ . . + 
subgoal$ + nq -+ goal; + . -+ goa& + subgoal, ; and 
(f) n 1 is ordered before n2 by the ordering-constraints of the plan. 
To say that a plan is presumptively-sound is just to say that its causal-links encode a 
causal structure derived from the set of planning-conditionals and the start-state. If a plan 
is presumptively-sound then every linearization of the plan satisfies conditions (i), (ii), and 
(iv) of the definition of “result”. However, the plan may fail to achieve its goal because 
condition (iii) may not be satisfied. In other words, there may be a linearization of the 
plan in which, for some causal-link n 1 -+ subgoal, -+ . . ’ + subgoal,, + n2 -+ goal, -+ 
. . + goal, 3 subgoal,, is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by the plan-steps 
up through n1, but some step n occurs between nl and n2 which makes subgoal,., false 
again before it can be “used’ by n2 to achieve goal,. Let us define: 
A plan-step n of a plan subgoul, + . -+ 
-+ n2 -+ goal, -+ .. . + goal,, to the plan iff there is a 
linearization of the plan in which n occurs between n 1 and n2 and either - subgoal, 
or the negation of a conjunct of subgoal, is a result of the sequence of actions 
prescribed by the plan-steps *start*, . . . n in the linearization relative to the set of 
all true planning-conditionals. 
I will also say that the plan itself undermines one of its causal-links if one of its plan-steps 
does so relative to that plan. Let us define: 
A plan is causally-sound iff it is presumptively-sound relative to a set of true 
planning-conditionals and the plan does not undermine any of its own causal-links. 
It is possible to prove the following theorems: 
Theorem 1. If a plan is causally-sound then it is sound. 
Theorem 2. If a goal is a result oj’ an uction-sequence (Al, . . , A,,), then there is a 
causally-sound plan for that goal some linearization of which prescribes the actions 
Al,....A, inthutorder 
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The proofs are in Appendix A. 
It is easily verified that plans produced by reasoning in accordance with PROPOSE- 
NULL-PLAN, COAL-REGRESSION, and SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL are presumptively- 
sound. However, if SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL is used the plans may fail to be sound 
because they may undermine some of their own causal-links. Thus for reasoning about 
plans, we must add some procedures that find and, if possible, repair underminings. 
2.6. Searching,fi>r underminings and repairing them 
There are essentially two ways to go about finding and repairing underminings. The 
most straightforward is to search for underminings in essentially the same way we search 
for plans. A plan is undermined by a subplan, consisting of a subset of the plan-steps of 
the plan ordered in a manner consistent with the plan. The subplan undermines the plan 
by achieving a goal -g which is the negation of some subgoal, and doing so between the 
time g is achieved and the time it is used. The subplan must be sound, i.e., it must really 
achieve -g. But more is required. It must achieve -g in the context of the larger plan. 
That is, the larger plan cannot, in turn undermine the subplan. This is captured by adding 
the rest of the steps of the original plan into the subplan, even though they are not used, and 
requiring that the resulting plan still achieves -g. The result of adding the unused steps to 
the subplan is an embellishment of the original plan, which is defined as follows: 
plan0 is an embellishment of plan iff (1) the plan-steps of plan0 are the same as the 
plan-steps of plan, and (2) any ordering imposed by plan on plan-steps of plan0 other 
than *finish* is also imposed by plan,. 
The intent of this definition is that *finish* need not occur at the end of plaq,. If it does 
not, then the definition of soundness given above ignores all plan-steps succeeding *finish*. 
The penultimate steps of a plan are those occurring immediately before *finish* in some 
linearization of the plan. It can then be proven: 
Theorem 3. A plan-step n of a plan undermines a causal-link n 1 + subgoal, + . . -+ 
subgoal,, -+ n2 + goal, + ... + goal,* of plan if there is a presumptively-sound 
embellishment plan0 of plan whose goal is either -subgoal, or the negation of a conjunct 
of subgoal,, and 
( 1) n is the single penultimate plan-step of planO, 
(2) there is a linearization of plan consistent with the ordering imposed by plan0 in 
which n occurs between n 1 and n2, and 
(3) plan, is sound. 
An immediate corollary of Theorems 1-3 is: 
Theorem 4. A plan-step n of a plan undermines a causal-link n 1 + subgoal, 4 . . 4 
subgoal,, 4 nz 4 goal, + . ’ . + goal, of plan zff there is a presumptively-sound 
embellishment plan0 of plan whose goal is either -subgoal, or the negation of a conjunct 
of subgoal,, and 
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there is a linearization of plan consistent with the ordering imposed by plan0 in 
which n occurs between nl and n2, and 
plan, does not undermine any of its own causal-links. 
The only plan-steps of plan0 that are relevant to undermining the causal-link are those 
not succeeding n2. We can always make plan0 linear, so Theorem 4 constitutes a recursive 
characterization of undermining. 
Underminings are produced by embellishments, and we can search for embellishments 
in essentially the same way we search for plans-using PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN, SPLIT- 
CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, and an analogue of GOAL-REGRESSION that takes plan-steps from 
plan rather than building new plan-steps. I will postpone the discussion of this until 
Section 4. 
Once an undermined link is found, we know that the plan will not achieve its goal in 
accordance with the causal-structure ncoded in its causal-links. ’ But it may be possible to 
modify the plan so as to avoid the undermining. The current planning literature recognizes 
two ways of doing this. The simplest is by adding ordering-constraints [24]. If a plan-step 
n of plan undermines the causal-link n 1 + subgoal + n2 + goal, but it is consistent with 
the ordering-constraints of plan that n not occur between n 1 and n2, then the undermining 
can be avoided by adding to plan the ordering-constraint hat n not occur between n 1 and 
no. Most AI planning systems do this by “promoting” or “demoting” n, i.e., ordering it 
either before n1 or after n2. However, it is also possible to simply impose the constraint 
that n not occur between n 1 and n2, without specifying whether it occurs before n 1 or after 
n2. The latter decision can be left to be determined either by subsequent planning reasoning 
or during plan execution. lo This suggests adopting the following reasoning-schema: 
ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (gl & g2), and plans 
plan, for gl and plan2 for g2, if plan & is a putative plan for (gl & g2) constructed by 
merging plans plan1 and plan2 (and possibly other plans), but a plan-step n of plan & 
undermines one of its own causal-links n1 -+ subgoal1 + . . . --+ subgoal,, + n:! + 
goal, + . . + goal,, construct a plan plan+ by adding the ordering-constraint hat n 
not occur between n 1 and n2 (if this can be done consistently) and propose plan+ as a 
plan for (gr 8~ g2). 
ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT must be taken to make a defeasible proposal, because 
plun& might undermine more than one of its causal-links and plan+ repairs just one of 
these. The other underminings would also have to be repaired, one at a time. 
9 The plan might still achieve its goal fortuitously, because of other planning-conditionals that might relate its 
plan-steps appropriately without being encoded in the causal-links. 
lo The OSCAR planner works this way. Adding the constraint that one node not occur between two others is 
equivalent to adding the disjunctive constraint that he node occur either before the earlier node or after the later 
node, and adding that to a partial ordering is equivalent to adopting adisjunction of partial orderings. Another 
planner that works this way is DESCARTES 1181. 
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The other recognized way of repairing underminings is called “confrontation”, and is 
due to Penberthy and Weld [28]. ” This consists of adding plan-steps to plan in such a 
way that the embellishment responsible for the undermining itself becomes undermined: 
CONFRONTATION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (gl & gz), and plans 
plunl for gt and plan2 for g2, if plan& is a putative plan for (gt & g2) constructed 
by merging plans plan1 and plan2 (and possibly other plans), but a plan-step 12 of 
plan & undermines one of its own causal-links n 1 + subgoal, L+ . . + subgoal,, --+ 
n2 -+ goal1 + .. . + goal, by virtue of there being an embellishment plan0 that 
achieves P, where P is either -subgoal, or the negation of a conjunct of subgoalI, 
then for each causal-link no + G1 + . . a -+ G, -+ n + P of pZuno, adopt interest 
in finding a plan for achieving -Gt (or if Gl is a conjunction, for each conjunct of 
G 1, adopt interest in finding a plan for achieving its negation). If a plan repair-plan 
is proposed for achieving “Gl or the negation of one of its conjuncts, construct a 
new plan plan+ by adding to plan& the plan-steps, ordering-constraints, and causal- 
links of repair-plan, with the following exception. Replace each causal-link of the 
form n* + SG1 + . . . + SG, -+ *$nish* --f SG,, in repair-plan by the causal-link 
n* -+ SG1 + . . . -+ SG, + n2 --+ SG, and order n* before n. If this ordering is 
consistent, propose plan+ as a plan for achieving (gl & 82). I2 
Just as for ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT, CONFRONTATION must be taken to make a 
defeasible proposal. 
I have formulated ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT and CONFRONTATION as supple- 
ments to SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, but they could instead be built into SPLIT- 
CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY by rewriting the latter roughly as follows: 
SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (Gt & Gz), adopt 
interest in finding plans plan, for G 1 and plan2 for G2. If such plans are proposed and 
plan, + plan2 does not undermine any of its causal-links, propose plan1 + plan2 as a 
plan for (Gl & G2). If the plan1 +pZun2 does undermine some of its causal-links, then 
search for a way of repairing plan1 + plan, by adding ordering-constraints and/or using 
confrontation to avoid the interference, and propose the resulting plan instead. 
2.7. Searching for threats and resolving them 
The OSCAR planner works in the manner just described, but most AI planning 
systems work somewhat differently. Instead of searching for underminings, they search 
for “threats”. Let us define: 
A plan-step s of a plan plan threatens a causal-link n I + subgoal1 -+ . . . + 
subgoal,, + n2 -+ goal1 + ... + goal,,, of plan relative to a set conditionals of 
’ ’ They actually called the technique “separation”, but it was renamed “confrontation” by Weld [45]. 
l2 This rule of confrontation differs from that of Penberthy and Weld in that theirs is formulated in terms of 
threats rather than undermining. See below. 
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planning-conditionals iff (1) there is a linearization of plan in which s occurs between 
nt and n2, and (2) there is a conditional “(A/C) l -P” in conditionals where A is 
the action of s and P is either subgoal, or a conjunct of subgoal,. 
Threats are “potential underminings”. A threat is “real” only if there is a linearization 
of plan that constitutes an embellishment making C true at the time s is executed. The 
OSCAR planner ignores threats unless they are real. By contrast, most AI planning 
systems, like SNLP, UCPOP, or PRODIGY, take all threats seriously and try to resolve 
them by either adding ordering-constraints or using confrontation. In this connection, it 
makes a difference whether threats result from conditional or unconditional effects of 
actions. If a threat is produced by an unconditional effect, then it is guaranteed to be real, 
because the only way the action can get into the plan is by having the preconditional 
for the threatening effect already established. However, if a threat is produced by a 
conditional effect, then the action can get into the plan by having the precondition for 
some other effect of that same action established, and then the threat may not turn be real. 
In SNLP, actions have only unconditional effects, so all threats are real, but in UCPOP and 
PRODIGY that is not true. Parenthetically, it seems likely that in a domain of real-world 
complexity, all effects of actions are conditional effects. That is, the actions can, under 
some circumstances, be performed without having those effects. 
If a threat that is not real is resolved by adding ordering-constraints, this can lead to 
unnecessary ordering-constraints, and that in turn can cause trouble later in the planning 
process and can also make plan execution more costly than it need be. In other words, this 
violates the spirit of least-commitment planning. 
It may seem that resolving a threat that is not real by using confrontation will add 
unnecessary steps to a plan and will be computationally costly, but in fact that need not 
be true. If the threat is not real then plan never makes the precondition Gt true, in which 
case a null-plan suffices for achieving -Gt The process of finding the null-plan and 
resolving threats to it by constructing further null-plans and resolving threats to them, etc., 
is exactly as costly as searching for an undermining and failing to find it. So in fact, if the 
searches are done optimally, resolving threats by confrontation and repairing underminings 
by confrontation are equally costly. The former may add extra causal-links to a plan, but it 
will not add extra plan-steps. 
2.8. Completeness 
A planning system is complete if, given all true relevant planning-conditionals, it can 
always find a plan for achieving a goal if there is one. More precisely: 
A planning system is complete iff for every goal and start-state, if there is a plan that 
will achieve the goal relative to the start-state, then when given all the relevant true 
planning-conditionals the planning system will find some such plan. 
It can be proven that a planning system that searches for plans using PROPOSE-NULL- 
PLAN, GOAL-REGRESSION, and SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, then searches for either 
underminings or threats and in response to finding them modifies plans by adding 
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ordering-constraints or using confrontation, is complete. l3 In other words, this constitutes 
a complete basis for goal-regression planning. It should be noted, however, that this 
result presupposes the syntactical constraints on goals and planning-conditionals, and is 
based upon the Soundness Assumption. These assumptions will be examined critically in 
Section 4. 
3. R.e. planning and defeasible planning 
Contemporary AI planning theory is based upon what I will call be. planners. Given a 
planning problem, an r.e. planner runs a program that systematically searches the space of 
possible plans until it returns one that purports to solve the problem. What is important 
about such a planner is that it executes an effective computation. Defining this precisely: 
A planner is r.e. iff the set of pairs (problem, solution) that characterize the planner is 
recursively enumerable. 
In effect, contemporary goal-regression planners are based upon the three operations 
PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN, GOAL-REGRESSION, and SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY. 
There is, however, an insuperable logical problem for attempting to perform general- 
purpose goal-regression planning in an autonomous rational agent by running such an 
algorithm. The difficulty derives from the fact that any such algorithm must use some 
variant of SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY to handle conjunctive goals. Recall that 
SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY wasformulatedasfollows: 
SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (Gt & G2), adopt 
interest in finding plans plan1 for Gl and plan2 for G2. If such plans are proposed 
and do not destructively interfere with each other, propose pZanl + plan2 as a plan for 
(G 1 & G2). If the plans do destructively interfere with each other, then search for a way 
of repairing plan1 + plan2 by adding ordering-constraints and/or using confrontation to 
avoid the interference, and propose the resulting plan instead. 
Destructive interference was cashed out in terms of either underminings or threats. 
Assuming that a planner is a goal-regression planner that works as above by splitting 
conjunctive goals into their conjuncts and merging the plans for the conjuncts, an 
r.e. planner will only be possible if the set of destructive interferences is effectively 
computable, i.e., recursive. If the set of destructive interferences is not effectively 
computable, the planner will not be able to use SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY to 
determine whether two plans can be merged or, when there is destructive interference, 
whether it can be repaired. 
In order for destructive interference to be computable, it must be computable whether 
a particular condition (the negation of a precondition of one of the plan-steps) is a 
consequence of an action under specifiable circumstances. Standard AI planning systems 
” The proof is essentially the same as the proof of the completeness of UCPOP given by Penberthy and Weld 
[28]. Alternatively, see Section 4. 
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accomplish this by assuming that all relevant planning-conditionals are contained in a 
database at the time planning begins, and hence the consequences of actions can be 
determined by simply looking them up in a table (using unification). Such planners do 
no reasoning or very little reasoning about the consequences of actions, relying instead on 
precompiled knowledge built into the plan operators. I4 
It is useful to make a distinction between applied planning systems and planning systems 
that are intended to formalize and automate the planning of an autonomous rational agent 
(e.g., a human being). AI planning theory has had a number of practical applications, and 
is one of the success stories of AI. However, practical applications of AI planning theory 
have been largely confined to well behaved domains in which the goals are fixed and all 
the relevant information can be precompiled and supplied to the planner. The planner then 
runs a program that searches the space of possible plans (relative to the given information) 
until it finds a plan whose execution is guaranteed to achieve the goals. In such “applied 
planning”, a planner is a tool used by a human being, and in order to use the tool effectively 
the human must prepare the ground very carefully, being sure to give the planner all the 
knowledge needed to solve the planning problem. 
One of the ideals to which AI aspires is the construction of autonomous rational 
agents capable of maneuvering through a complex, variable, and often uncooperative 
environment. Planning will be an essential ingredient in any such agent. However, the 
planning problem faced by such an agent contrasts in important ways with the kind of 
applied planning problem that is solved by current AI planning technology. The most 
obvious difference is that, in sharp contrast to applied planning, it cannot be assumed 
that a planning agent has exactly the knowledge it needs to solve a planning problem. 
An autonomous agent must build its own knowledge base. The system designer can 
get things started by providing background knowledge, but the agent must be provided 
with cognitive machinery enabling its knowledge base to grow and evolve as it gains 
experience of its environment, senses its immediate surroundings, and reasons about the 
consequences of beliefs it already holds. The more complex the environment, the more 
the autonomous agent will have to be self-sufficient for knowledge acquisition. I have 
distinguished between practical cognition and epistemic cognition. The principal function 
of epistemic cognition in an autonomous agent is to provide the information needed for 
practical cognition. As such, the course of epistemic cognition is driven by practical 
interests. Rather than coming to the planning problem equipped with all the knowledge 
required for its solution, the planning problem itself directs epistemic cognition, focusing 
epistemic endeavors on the pursuit of information that will be helpful in solving current 
planning problems. 
Paramount among this information is knowledge about what will happen if certain 
actions are taken under certain circumstances. Sometimes the agent already knows what 
will happen, but often it has to figure it out. At the very least this will require reasoning 
from current knowledge. In many cases it will require the empirical acquisition of new 
knowledge that cannot be obtained just by reasoning from what is already known. For 
example, in order to construct a plan the planning agent may have to find out what time 
I4 This originated with STRIPS [IO], which built the requisite planning-conditionals into the plan operators 
themselves. Subsequent AI planners have followed suit. 
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it is, and it may be able to do that only by examining the world in some way (e.g., it 
may have to go into the next room and look at the clock). In general, such empirical 
investigations are carried out by performing actions (not just by reasoning). Figuring out 
what actions to perform is a matter of engaging in further planning. The agent acquires 
the epistemic goal of acquiring certain information, and then plans for how to accomplish 
that. So planning drives epistemic investigation which may in turn drive further planning. 
It follows that an essential characteristic of planning agents is that planning and epistemic 
cognition are interleaved. Unlike applied planning, it is impossible to require of a planning 
agent capable of functioning in realistically complex environments that it acquire all the 
requisite knowledge before beginning the plan search. 
Now let us apply this to the question whether human beings (and other rational agents) 
can perform their planning by implementing planning algorithms of the sort described in 
Section 2. As I have argued, that is only possible if destructive interference is computable, 
which in turn requires that the consequences of actions be computable. As we have seen, 
autonomous planning agents cannot rely on precompiled knowledge. They must engage 
in genuine reasoning about the consequences of actions, and we should not expect that 
reasoning to be any simpler than general epistemic reasoning. Realistically, epistemic 
reasoning must be defeasible, which makes the set of conclusions at best AT. l5 But even 
if we could construct an agent that did only first-order deductive reasoning, the set of 
conclusions is not effectively computable-it is recursively enumerable. Even for such an 
unrealistically oversimplified planner, destructive interference will not be computable- 
the set of destructive interferences will be only r.e. This means that when the planning 
algorithm computes plans for the conjuncts of a conjunctive goal and then considers 
whether they can be merged without destructive interference, the reasoning required to 
find any particular destructive interference may take indefinitely long, and if there is no 
destructive interference, there will be no point at which the planner can draw the conclusion 
that there is none simply on the grounds that none has been found. Thus the planning 
algorithm will bog down at this point and will never be able to produce the merged plan 
for the conjunctive goal. I6 
If destructive interference is not computable, how can a planner get away with dividing 
conjunctive goals into separate conjuncts and planning for each conjunct separately? The 
key to this problem emerges from considering how human beings solve it. Humans assume 
defeasibly that the separate plans do not destructively interfere with one another, and so 
infer defeasibly that the merged plan is a good plan for the conjunctive goal. In other 
words, human goal-regression planning is based on SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL rather 
than SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY. Having made this defeasible inference, human 
planners then look for destructive interference that would defeat it, but they do not regard 
” A2 sets are sometimes called “trial and error sets”. R.e. sets can be “approximated from below” by an 
algorithm that systematically adds members without ever having to take any out of the set. By contrast, A2 
sets can only be approximated “from above and below simultaneously”, by an algorithm that systematically adds 
members, but doesn’t always get them right and may have to remove members later. For further discussion of 
this, see Pollock [34, Chapter 31. 
I6 Notice that a similar problem arises in applying PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN, which may require an indeterminate 
amount of reasoning to determine that the subgoal is already true. If the requisite reasoning is not at least r.e., 
then the planning cannot be r.e. 
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it as essential to establish that there is no destructive interference before they make the 
inference. And if, at the time plan execution is to begin, no destructive interference has 
been discovered, then we humans go ahead and execute the plan despite the fact that we 
have not proven conclusively that there is no destructive interference. 
One may be tempted to suppose that human beings are making an unreasonable leap of 
faith here, and that a more rational agent would postpone plan execution until it has been 
established that there is no destructive interference. However, the logic of the epistemic 
search for destructive interference makes that logically impossible. Given a logically 
complex knowledge base, there will not, in general, be a point at which an agent can 
conclude with certainty that there is no destructive interference within a plan, so an agent 
that required such certainty would be unable to complete and execute any of its plans. 
The problem I have raised is specifically a problem for goal-regression planners that 
employ SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY to reason about conjunctive goals. Might we 
be able to circumvent this problem by employing some other kind of r.e. planner? Erol et 
al. [7] prove that for a wide variety of STRIPS planning domains, the problem of finding 
a plan is at least semi-decidable, and hence r.e. planners are possible in such domains. 
However, this result assumes a fixed (finite) set of STRIPS operators (or equivalently, 
planning-conditionals). My point concerns the quite different situation in which we may 
have to discover new planning-conditionals in order to solve the planning problem. In fact, 
the following simple theorem shows there is no way around the problem I have posed for 
ce. planners: 
Theorem 5. If the set of planning-conditionals is Ee. but not recursive, then the set qf 
sound solution-pairs (problem, solution) is not ze. 
The upshot of this is that a rational agent operating in a realistically complex 
environment must make defeasible assumptions in the course of its planning, and then be 
prepared to change its planning decisions later if subsequent epistemic reasoning defeats 
those defeasible assumptions. In other words, the reasoning involved in planning must be a 
species of defeasible reasoning. Planning by autonomous agents in complex environments 
cannot be done by an rze. planner. I’ 
4. Reasoning defeasibly about plans 
The general way goal-regression planning must work in autonomous rational agents 
is by performing goal regression, splitting conjunctive goals into their conjuncts and 
planning for them separately, and then merging the plans for the individual conjuncts 
" Ferguson and Allen [9] describe a different use of defeasible reasoning in planning. They use defeasible 
reasoning as a way of avoiding the ramification problem. I propose my own solution to the ramification problem 
in [38]. Ginsberg [ 121 explores an idea related to the defeasible approach. He considers planners that find plans 
that “almost always work”, and shows that under certain circumstances plans for the individual conjuncts can be 
merged to form plans for conjunctions that “almost always work”. This accommodates incomplete planning, and 
is done in the interest of planning efficiency. By contrast, the defeasible approach described here is intended to 
accommodate incomplete knowledge. 
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into a combined plan for the conjunctive goal. The planning agent will infer defeasibly 
that the merged plan is a solution to the planning problem. A defeater for this defeasible 
inference consists of discovering that the plan contains destructive interference. Whenever 
a defeasible reasoner makes a defeasible inference, it must adopt interest in finding 
defeaters, so in this case the agent will adopt interest in finding destructive interference. 
Finding such interference should lead the agent to try various ways of repairing the plan 
to eliminate the interference, and then lead to a defeasible inference that the repaired plan 
is a solution to the planning problem. The tentative conclusion being adopted is that the 
plan will achieve its goal. Goal-regression planning becomes a form of epistemic reasoning 
to the effect that if a plan is executed (in any way consistent with the ordering) then it is 
defeasibly reasonable to expect the goal to be achieved. This turns PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN, 
GOAL-REGRESSION,SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL,ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINTS, and 
CONFRONTATION, into epistemic operations leading to epistemic conclusions. In other 
words, they are epistemic inference-schemes. GOAL-REGRESSION differs from the other 
rules in that it produces conclusions that (given the Soundness Assumption) follow 
deductively from the premises to which it appeals. The other rules produce conclusions 
that follow only defeasibly. For instance, in the absence of any reason for thinking that 
pEan, + plan2 is internally defective, SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL makes it reasonable 
to conclude that plunl + plan2 will achieve (Cl & Gz), but if it is subsequently 
discovered that plant +pkq is internally defective, then the conclusion that it will achieve 
(Gt & G2)shouldbewithdrawn. ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINTS and CONFRONTATION 
work similarly. 
This way of understanding goal-regression planning contrasts sharply with conventional 
AI planning theory, which attempts to proceed non-defeasibly by employing a variant 
of SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL-SAFELY instead of SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, but as 
I have argued, such an approach to planning cannot work as a general theory of goal- 
regression planning. It can only work in narrowly circumscribed contexts in which the 
planner can be given all relevant knowledge from the beginning and does not have to 
engage in epistemic reasoning during the course of the planning. 
I will assume the general theory of defeasible reasoning embodied in OSCAR [34], 
and the implementation discussed below will be based upon the implemented OSCAR 
architecture. Reasoning in OSCAR consists of the construction of natural-deduction-style 
arguments, using both deductive inference rules and defeasible reason-schemas. Premises 
are input to the reasoner (either as background knowledge or as new percepts), and queries 
are passed to the reasoner. OSCAR performs bidirectional reasoning. The reasoner reasons 
forwards from the premises and backwards from the queries. The queries are “epistemic 
interests”, and backwards reasoning can be viewed as deriving interests from interests. 
The complete set of inference-schemes required for this approach to goal-regression 
planning can be formulated as follows: 
PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving goal, if goal is already true, infer non- 
defeasibly that a null-plan will achieve goal. 
GOAL-REGRESSION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving G, adopt interest in finding planning- 
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conditionals (A/C) w G having G as their consequent. Given such a conditional, adopt 
an interest in finding a plan for achieving C. If it is concluded that a plan subplun will 
achieve C, construct a plan by (1) adding a new step to the end of subplan where the 
new step prescribes the action A, (2) ordering the new step after all steps of subplun, 
and (3) adjusting the causal-links appropriately. Infer nondefeasibly that the new plan 
will achieve G. 
SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (Gr & G2), adopt 
interest in finding plans plan, for G 1 and plan2 for Gz. If such plans are proposed, infer 
defeasibly that plan, +plun2 will achieve (G 1 & G2). 
ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (gi & g2), and plans 
plan1 for gr and plan2 for g2, if plan & is a putative plan for (gi & g2) constructed by 
merging plans plan1 and plan, (and possibly other plans), but a plan-step n of plan& 
undermines one of its own causal-links n 1 -+ subgoal, + . . -+ subgoal, -+ n2 -+ 
goal1 + . . . + goal,, construct a plan plan+ by adding the ordering-constraint hat n 
not occur between nr and n2 (if this can be done consistently) and infer defeasibly that 
plan+ will achieve (gr & ~2). 
CONFRONTATION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (gi & g2), and 
plans plan1 for gr and plan2 for g2, if plan& is a putative plan for (gr & 82) 
constructed by merging plans plan1 and plan2 (and possibly other plans), but a plan- 
step n of plan & undermines one of its own causal-links n1 -+ subgoal, -+ . . + 
subgoal,, -+ n2 + goal1 + . . . + goal,,, by virtue of there being an embellishment 
plan0 that achieves P, where P is either -subgoal, or the negation of a conjunct 
of subgoalI, then for each causal-link no --+ G1 + . . . + G, + n + P of piano, 
adopt interest in finding a plan for achieving -Gr (or if Gi is a conjunction, for each 
conjunct of Gr, adopt interest in finding a plan for achieving its negation). If a plan 
repair-plan is proposed for achieving -Gi or the negation of one of its conjuncts, 
construct a new plan plan+ by adding to plan& the plan-steps, ordering-constraints, 
and causal-links of repair-plan, with the following exception. Replace each causal-link 
of the form n* -+ SG, -+ . . . + SG, *finish* --+ SG, in repair-plan by the causal-link 
n* --+ SG] + . . . -+ SG, + n + SG, and order n* between no and n. If this ordering 
is consistent, infer defeasibly that plan+ will achieve (g 1 & g2). 
UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINKS 
Givenaninferenceinaccordancewith SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, ADD-ORDERING- 
CONSTRAINT, or CONFRONTATION to the conclusion thatplan& will achieve (Gi & G2), 
adopt interest in establishing that plan & undermines one of its own causal-links. If it is 
determined that it does undermine one of its own causal-links, take the inference to the 
conclusion that plan & will achieve (G 1 & G2) to be defeated. 
Let us say that a plan achieves its goal between two plan-steps iff it achieves its goal and 
all its penultimate steps are ordered between the two plan-steps. Similarly, a plan achieves 
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its goal before a plan-step iff it achieves its goal and all its penultimate steps are ordered 
before the plan-step. 
UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINK 
Given an interest in establishing that plan& undermines one of its own causal-links, 
for each causal-link nt -+ subgoal1 -+ . . . + subgoal,, + n2 -+ goal1 + . . . + goal, 
of plan&, adopt interest in finding an embellishment plan0 of plan& that achieves 
-g between nl and n2 consistent with the ordering-constraints of plan&, where g is 
either subgoal1 or a conjunct of subgoalI. Given plan,,, infer nondefeasibly that plan & 
undermines one of its own causal-links. 
The search for embellishments can be performed using analogues of the inference- 
schemes used in searching for plans in the first place, with the difference that the analogues 
use only the plan-steps of plan &. They start with plan & stripped of its causal-links, and 
simply add causal-links and ordering-constraints. 
EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION 
Given an interest in finding an embellishment of plan that achieves G before n2 (and 
optionally after nl) consistent with a set of ordering-constraints order, adopt interest 
in finding planning-conditionals (A/C) l G having G as their consequent for which 
there is a plan-step n of plan such that (1) the action prescribed by n is A, and (2) it 
is consistent with order that n occur before n2 (and optionally after nr ). Given such a 
conditional and plan-step, let order+ be the result of adding to order the constraint that n 
occur before n2 (and optionally after n I), Adopt an interest in finding an embellishment 
of plan that achieves C before n consistent with order+. If an embellishment plan0 is 
proposed for achieving C before n consistent with order+, construct an embellishment 
plan+ by adding a causal-link to record the achievement of G by n and adjusting the 
ordering-constraints accordingly. Infer defeasibly that plan+ is an embellishment of 
plan that achieves G before n2 (and optionally after nl) consistent with order. 
EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION, unlike GOAL-REGRESSION, is defeasible. This is be- 
cause in EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION, the causal-link achieving G may be under- 
mined by other plan-steps in plan that can be consistently ordered between the causal- 
link root and the causal-link target. In GOAL-REGRESSION, on the other hand, there are 
no plan-steps in the plan so far constructed that can be consistently ordered between the 
causal-link root and the causal-link target. The defeat of EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION 
is accomplished by the following variant of UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINKS: 
UNDERMINE-EMBEDDED-CAUSAL-LINKS 
Givenaninferenceinaccordancewith EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION,ADD-EMBED- 
DED-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT, or EMBEDDED-CONFRONTATION to the conclusion 
that plan+ is an embellishment of plan that achieves G before n2 (and optionally after 
n 1) consistent with order, adopt interest in establishing that plan+ undermines one of its 
own causal-links. If it is determined that it does undermine one of its own causal-links, 
take the inference to the conclusion that plan+ is an embellishment of plun that achieves 
G before 9~2 (and optionally after IZ 1) consistent with order to be defeated. 
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EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION terminates with goals that are already established: 
EMBEDDED-NULL-PLAN 
Given an interest in finding an embellishment of plan that will achieve goal before plan- 
step n consistent with order, if goal is already true, construct plan0 by (1) letting its plan- 
steps be the plan-steps of plun, (2) letting the ordering-constraints of plan0 be order, and 
(3) taking the only causal-link to be *start* + goal -+ *finish* --+ goal. From the truth 
of goal infer nondefeasibly that plan, is an embellishment of plan that will achieve goal 
before plan-step n consistent with order. 
SPLIT-EMBEDDED-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL 
Given an interest in finding an embellishment of plan that will achieve a conjunctive 
goal (GI & Gz) before plan-step n consistent with order, adopt interest in finding 
embellishments plan1 and plan, that will achieve G 1 and Gz, respectively, before plan- 
step n consistent with order. If such embellishments are proposed, infer nondefeasibly 
that plunl + plan2 is an embellishment of plan that will achieve a conjunctive goal 
(G 1 & G2) before plan-step II consistent with order. 
Note that unlike SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, SPLIT-EMBEDDED-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL 
is not defeasible. This is because plan, + plan2 has the same plan-steps as both plan, 
both ptun2, so if a causal-link of either plan* or plan, is undermined by plan1 + plun2, it 
will already be undermined in plunl or plan2 itseif when it is constructed by EMBEDDED- 
GOAL-REGRESSION. 
We can try to repair embellishments that undermine their own causal-links by either 
adding ordering-constraints or confrontation: 
ADD-EMBEDDED-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT 
Given an interest in finding an embellishment of plan that achieves G before n2 
(and optionally after nl ) consistent with a set of ordering-constraints order, if plan+ 
is a putative such embellishment but a plan-step n of plan+ undermines one of its 
own causal-links n 1 --+ subgoal, + . . . --+ subgoal, -+ n2 -+ goal, + . . -+ goal,,, , 
construct a plan plan++ by adding the ordering-constraint that n not occur between 
n1 and n2 (if this can be done consistently) and infer defeasibly that plan++ is an 
embellishment of plan that achieves G before n2 (and optionally after n 1) consistent 
with a set of ordering-constraints order. 
EMBEDDED-CONFRONTATION 
Given an interest in finding an embellishment of plan that achieves G before n2 (and 
optionally after n 1) consistent with a set of ordering-constraints order, if plan+ is a 
putative such embellishment but a plan-step n of plan+ undermines one of its own 
causal-links n1 + subgoal, + .. . --+ subgoul, + n2 -+ goal1 -+ . . . -+ goal,,, by 
virtue of there being an embellishment plan0 of plan+ that achieves P, where P is 
either --subgoal, or the negation of a conjunct of subgoal,, then for each causal-link 
no+ GI + .‘. -+ G, + n + P of plan@, adopt interest in finding an embellishment 
plan++ of plan+ that achieves -GI (or if Gt is a conjunction, achieves the negation 
of one conjunct of Gt ) between no and n. If such an embellishment repair-plan is 
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found, construct a new embellishment plan++ of plan by adding to plan+ the ordering- 
constraints and causal-links of repair-plan, with the following exception. Replace each 
causal-link of the form n* + SGl -+ . . . + SG, 3 *$nish* + SC,, in repair-plan by 
the causal-link n* + SG1 + . . -+ SG, + n + SC, and order n* between no and n. 
If this ordering is consistent, infer defeasibly that plan++ is an embellishment of plan 
that achieves G before n2 (and optionally after n 1) consistent with a set of ordering- 
constraints order. 
As before, ADD-EMBEDDED-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT and EMBEDDED-CONFRONTA- 
TION repair underminings one at a time. Further underminings may remain, so the 
inferences in accordance with these two inference-schemes are defeasible in accordance 
with UNDERMINE-EMBEDDED-CAUSAL-LINKS. 
4.1. Evaluating a defeasible planner 
An r.e. planner is evaluated by asking whether it is sound and complete. It is sound if 
every plan it proposes for achieving a goal is a sound plan, and it is complete if it finds a 
sound plan for achieving a goal whenever one exists. But how can we evaluate a defeasible 
planner? It will inevitably find unsound plans. Hopefully, it will retract them later. 
A distinction can be made between the conclusions that a defeasible reasoner is justiJied 
in holding, at any given stage of its reasoning, and the warranted conclusions that it will be 
justified in holding at the limit, when all possible relevant reasoning has been performed. ‘* 
What we want of a defeasible planner is that it will eventually draw warranted conclusions 
that constitute sound solutions to planning-problems. Let us call the plans endorsed by 
warranted conclusions warranted plans. A first pass at a criterion of adequacy would 
require that warranted plans are always sound, and whenever there is a sound plan for 
achieving a goal there will be a sound warranted plan. However, this criterion of adequacy 
is still too strong. The reasoner might be warranted in taking an unsound plan to be sound 
simply because the reasoner is unable to draw the conclusion that some relevant fact about 
the world is a fact or that some relevant consequence of an action is a consequence of that 
action. For the same reason it may be unable to find some sound plan. 
We can usefully separate the plan-reasoning from the reasoning aimed at finding factual 
knowledge of use in the planning. The reason-schemas used in planning may be beyond 
reproach, but the reasoner may still find unsound plans and fail to find sound ones because 
its factual reasoning is inadequate. This separation can be achieved by noting that the 
concept of a sound plan was defined to be relative to a start-state and a set of planning- 
conditionals. A plan is sound relative to a start-state and set of planning-conditionals iff 
for every linearization of the plan its goal is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed 
by its plan-steps relative to the start-state and the set of planning-conditionals. In defeasible 
planning, the relevant start-state consists of the set of all warranted conclusions, and the 
relevant set of planning-conditionals is the set of all warranted planning-conditionals. We 
can then define defeasible planner to be sound iff all its warranted plans are sound relative 
to the set of warranted conclusions and warranted planning-conditionals, and it is complete 
” This i( made more precise in Chapter 3 ot’ Pollock [34] 
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iff whenever there is a plan for achieving a goal that is sound relative to the set of its 
warranted conclusions and warranted planning-conditionals, the planner is able to find 
some such plan. 
We can evaluate the soundness and completeness of a defeasible planner by simply giv- 
ing the reasoner all the factual knowledge (including knowledge of planning-conditionals) 
that is relevant to solving the problem, and then asking whether under those circumstances 
all its warranted plans are sound and whether it is always able to find a sound plan for 
achieving a goal when there is a one. Giving the reasoner all the relevant factual knowledge 
has the effect of turning the defeasible planner into an r.e. planner. Search for planning- 
conditionals or goals true in the start-state will terminate after a single step, so for each 
plan there will be a determinate point at which there is no more relevant reasoning to be 
done. We can take the planner to “return” the plan iff at that point it is justified in conclud- 
ing that the plan will achieve its goal. Because all the relevant reasoning has been done, 
the plan will be warranted iff the reasoner is justified in drawing that conclusion at that 
point. 
The r.e. planner that is generated in this way by the defeasible plan reasoning described 
above can be shown to be sound and complete by appealing to Theorems 1 and 4. For 
this purpose we need the assumption that the control structure for the defeasible reasoner 
searches the space of potential inferences systematically. It then follows that the inference- 
schemes have the effect of systematically expanding the recursive characterization of 
undermining provided by Theorem 4. The result is: 
Theorem 6. If OSCAR searches the space of potential inferences systematically then the 
OSCAR planner is sound. 
Theorem 7. If OSCAR searches the space of potential inferences systematically then the 
OSCAR planner is complete. 
5. Planning and the Frame Problem 
I have presented a tentative account of the logical structure of goal-regression planning 
in autonomous rational agents. This account differs in some important ways from 
conventional AI planning theory, but it also makes heavy reliance on certain aspects of 
the conventional theory. In particular, it turns on the Soundness Assumption, according to 
which a linear plan achieves a goal relative to a start-state iff the goal is a result of the 
sequence of actions prescribed by the plan-steps relative to the start-state and the set of all 
true planning-conditionals, where “result” is a technical concept that was defined by (Rl). 
To evaluate the Soundness Assumption we must consider more carefully what it means. It 
seems to say the following: 
Necessarily, a linear plan will achieve a goal G when executed from a start-state iff 
G is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by its plan-steps relative to the 
start-state and the set of all true planning-conditionals 
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But so interpreted, the Soundness Assumption is obviously false (as, I think, everyone 
in AI agrees). The difficulty concerns clause (iii) of (Rl). Clause (iii) asserts that once a 
subgoal has been established, it will remain true unless some later step of the plan makes 
it false. The world is a dynamic, continually changing place. It is certainly not a necessary 
truth that subgoals established by earlier steps of a plan will not be made false by events 
extraneous to the plan before the subgoals can be used in establishing further goals. 
In AI it is often claimed that goal-regression planning relies upon the so-called “STRIPS 
assumption” according to which nothing changes in the world unless it does so as a result 
of executing a step of the plan. l9 But such an assumption is obviously silly. We engage 
in goal-regression planning all the time without believing the STRIPS assumption, so the 
STRIPS assumption cannot provide the logical basis for our planning. 
We do not expect that nothing will change in the world unless we change it, but we do 
expect our plan to work. This means that we have a limited expectation, not that nothing 
will change, but that the particular subgoals established by initial steps of the plan will not 
change unless executing later steps of the plan causes them to change. We certainly do not 
believe that plans will never be disrupted by extraneous events, but we do expect that not 
to happen in any particular case. We are, however, always prepared to be proven wrong. 
In other words, our expectation is defeasible. We know that things change, but there is a 
presumptior against it in any particular case. 
Providing the logical foundations for such a defeasible expectation is just the Frame 
ProbZem. Early attempts in AI to give a logical reconstruction of reasoning about the 
consequences of actions tried doing so by axiomatizing the domain and then reasoning 
about it deductively. It quickly became apparent that such an approach required not only 
axioms describing how things change, but also a much larger set of “frame axioms” 
describing when things don’t change. 2o Getting such axioms right in a complex domain 
seems to be a practical impossibility, and even if we had such axioms the deductive 
reasoning task would be made infeasible by the huge number of frame axioms required. 
The Frame Problem became the problem of finding some feasible way of reasoning about 
both change and non-change. *’ That is precisely the problem facing us here. In goal- 
regression planning we want to be able to assume defeasibly that the truth values of our 
subgoals will not change until we do something to change them, and we want to use that 
assumption in reasoning about what will change as a result of executing the plan-steps for 
which the subgoals are the preconditions. 
Al researchers quickly gave up the attempt to solve the Frame Problem deductively, 
and proposed instead that there is a defeasible presumption that things don’t change. The 
thinking was that given such a defeasible presumption, the only substantive principles we 
need are causal principles overriding the defeasible presumption in specific cases. ** I have 
recently explored ways of making this reasoning precise (and implementing it) within the 
OSCAR system of defeasible reasoning, and I will summarize my results here. 23 
I9 See Allen [I] and Lifschitz [23]. 
2o McCarthy and Hayes [25]. 
” There is a lot of disagreement about what the Frame Problem really is. For historical substantiation of my 
interpretation of it. see Pollock [38]. 
22 McCarthy and Hayes [2S]. 
2.1 Pollock [36,38]. 
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5. I. Temporal projection 
As a first approximation, we can formulate a defeasible presumption against change as 
follows: 
If to < tl , believing P-at-to is a defeasible reason for the agent to believe P-at-t], 
the strength of the reason being a monotonic decreasing function of tl - to. 24 (11 
Principle (1) is a principle of temporal projection. It amounts to a presumption that P’s 
being true is a stable property of a time. A stable property is one such that if it holds at 
one time, the probability is high that it will continue to hold at a later time. Some such 
principle seems to be presupposed by much of our reasoning about the world. 25 However, 
as formulated, principle (1) is too strong. A constraint must be imposed on P. This is 
best demonstrated with an example, diagrammed in Fig. 1. 26 Let P and Q be unrelated 
propositions. Suppose we know that P is true at to, and false at the later time tl . Consider 
a third time t2 later than tl P-at-to gives us a defeasible reason for expecting P-at-t2, but 
-P-at-t1 gives us a stronger reason for expecting WP-at-t2, because (t2 - tl) -c (t2 - to). 
Thus an inference to P-at-t2 is defeated, but an inference to ^ r P-at-t2 is undefeated. This 
is as it should be. However, from P-at-to we can deductively infer (P v Q)-at-to. Without 
any restrictions on the proposition variable in temporal projection, (P v Q)-at-to gives 
us a defeasible reason for expecting (P v Q)-at-t2. Given the inference to “P-ut-t2, 
we can then infer Q-at-t2. In diagramming these inferences in Fig. 1, the solid arrows 
symbolize deductive inferences, and bars connecting arrows indicate that the inference is 
from multiple premises. The “fuzzy” arrow symbolizes a defeat relation. In this inference- 
graph, the conclusion Q-at-t2 is undefeated. But this is unreasonable. Q-at-t2 is inferred 
from (P v Q)-at-t2. (P v Q) is expected to be true at t2 only because it was true at to, 
and it was only true at to because P was true at to. This makes it reasonable to believe 
(P v Q)-at-t2 only insofar as it is reasonable to believe P-at-t2, but the latter is defeated. 
This example illustrates clearly that temporal projection does not work equally well for 
all propositions. In particular, the set of propositions for which temporal projection works 
is not closed under disjunction. Let us label those propositions for which it does work 
temporally-projectible. A principle of temporal projection must be restricted to temporally- 
projectible propositions: 
TEMPORAL-PROJECTION 
If P is temporally-projectible and to < tl, believing P-at-to is a defeasible reason for 
the agent to believe P-at-t1 , the strength of the reason being a monotonic decreasing 
function of tl - to. 
What are called “projectibility problems” arise in a number of places in philosophical 
epistemology. Goodman [ 141 first showed that inductive reasoning does not work equally 
well for all properties-that principles of induction require a projectibility constraint. In 
24 For a discussion of reason-strength, see Pollock [34]. 
‘5 For arguments to the effect that such reasoning is pervasive, see Pollock 1361 
26 An example with the same structure is presented by Myers and Smith [2h]. 
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-Patt2 
Q at t2 
Fig. 1. The need for a temporal projectibility constraint 
[32] I showed that many projectibility problems result from attempting to employ induction 
with respect to disjunctions. In [33] I showed that similar projectibility problems arise in 
other contexts-the statistical syllogism, direct inference, and statistical induction. In all 
of these contexts, disjunctions create major difficulties. Apparently, the same conclusion 
must be drawn for temporal projection. 
The need for a projectibility constraint is clear, but the exact content of the constraint 
is not. Disjunctions create projectibility problems, but they are not the only culprits. It 
is easy to see that conjunctions of temporally-projectible propositions are temporally- 
projectible. If we have an undefeated reason for believing P-at-t1 and an undefeated reason 
for believing Q-at-tl, then we can infer (P & Q)-at-t1 deductively, so the latter inference 
cannot be problematic. On the other hand, the negation of a conjunction is equivalent to a 
disjunction, so the negations of temporally-projectible propositions are not automatically 
temporally-projectible. This is clear for the negations of logically complex temporally- 
projectible propositions, but it also seems to be true for atomic propositions (however 
exactly this is to be understood). The ascriptions of “simple” properties to objects will 
generally be projectible, but the negations of such ascriptions need not be. For instance, 
“X is red” would seem to be temporally-projectible. But “x is not red” is equivalent to 
a disjunction “x is blue or green or yellow or orange or. . .“, and as such it would seem 
to be temporally-unprojectible. We can make many such observations about temporal- 
projectibility, but I do not have a general criterion of temporal-projectibility to propose. The 
literature contains no good theories of projectibility in any of its guises. 27 Constructing 
such a theory is at this time an unsolved philosophical problem. 
5.2. The Frame Problem resurrected 
TEMPORAL-PROJECTION was originally proposed as a solution to the Frame Problem. 
However, TEMPORAL-PROJECTION turns out to be only part of the solution, as was first 
shown by Hanks and McDermott [15]. To illustrate (with a different example than theirs), 
27 See Stalker [43] for a compendium ofwork on projectibility. 
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t0 tl t 2 
match is dry -+ match is dry 
match is lit 
match is struck 
match is not lit ) match is not lit 
Fig. 2. The Yale Match-Lighting Problem. 
suppose there is a causal law to the effect that if a match is dry and it is struck then it 
will bum. Suppose we have a match that is initially known to be dry, at time to. Shortly 
thereafter, at time tl , it is struck. We want to be able to conclude that it will light at some 
time tz (> tl). It may seem that TEMPORAL-PROJECTION allows us to make this inference. 
The match was known to be dry at to, so TEMPORAL-PROJECTION gives us a reason for 
expecting it to still be dry at tl . Then on the basis of the law we can infer that the match will 
bum at some time t:! > 11. However, as Hanks and McDermott observed, we also know that 
the match is not burning at time to, and so (assuming temporal-projectibility) TEMPORAL- 
PROJECTION gives us a reason for thinking it will not be burning at time t2. This conflicts 
with the conclusion that it will bum at time t2. Thus TEMPORAL-PROJECTION does not 
favor either the conclusion that the match will bum or the conclusion that the match will 
not bum. This is diagrammed in Fig. 2. But, intuitively, we want to conclude defeasibly that 
the match will still be dry at tl and hence will bum at t2. Thus TEMPORAL-PROJECTION 
does not solve the Frame Problem. 28 
There is a kind of consensus among researchers dealing with the Frame Problem that the 
solution to this problem lies in performing the temporal projections in temporal order. 29 
We first use TEMPORAL-PROJECTION to infer that the match is still dry at time tl . At that 
point, nothing has yet happened to block the application of TEMPORAL-PROJECTION, so 
we make this inference. From this we can infer that the match will bum at t2. At time 
t2, we can also try to use TEMPORAL-PROJECTION to infer that the match will not bum, 
but this time something has already happened (the match was struck while dry) to block 
the projection, and so we do not infer that the match will not burn. This general idea was 
first suggested by Shoham [40], and subsequently endorsed by Hanks and McDermott 
[16], Lifschitz [22], and others. I will follow the literature in calling this chronological 
minimalization (changes are minimized in chronological order). 
Attempts to formalize chronological minimalization have met with mixed success, 
largely, I think, because they were based upon inadequate theories of defeasible reasoning. 
In addition, Kautz [19] proposed a troublesome counterexample which seems to show 
that there is something wrong with the fundamental idea underlying chronological 
28 This is formulated more precisely in Pollock [38]. 
2y See Hanks and McDermott [ 161. A number of more recent papers explore this same idea. In planning theory 
there is a different kind of consensus, namely, that we should avoid trying to solve the Frame Problem in its full 
generality and just run a program that gets around it. That was a large part of the motivation for both the STRIPS 
and ADL representation of actions. But one of the points of this paper is that it is worth taking the Frame Problem 
seriously in order to avoid some of the limitations of those representations. 
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minimahzation. Modifying his example slightly, suppose I leave my car in a parking lot 
at time to. I return at time t3 to find it missing. Suppose I know somehow that it was 
stolen either at time tl or time t2, where to < tl < t2 < t3. Intuitively, there should be no 
reason to favor one of these times over the other as the time the car was stolen. However, 
chronological minimalization would have us use temporal projection first at tl to conclude 
that the car was still in the lot, and then because the car was stolen at either tl or t2, we can 
conclude that the car was stolen at t2. This seems completely unreasonable. 
The difference between the cases in which chronological minimalization gives the 
intuitively correct answer and the cases in which it does not seems to be that in the former 
there is a set of temporal projections that are rendered inconsistent by a causal connection 
between the propositions being projected. In the latter case, there is also a set of temporal 
projections not all of which can be correct, but the inconsistency does not result from a 
causal connection. So, for example, the match case is causal, but the stolen car case is not. 
In [35,36,38] I suggested a way of making this precise and implementing the reasoning. 
For present purposes, most of the details of that account are irrelevant. It is useful, however, 
to consider one aspect of the account given there. Thus far, I have talked about “planning- 
conditionals”, without trying to say just what kind of conditionals these are. It is clear, 
however, that to make goal-regression planning work, they must express the kind of causal- 
connections that are involved in the solution to the Frame Problem. My proposal is that the 
requisite causal connection is that expressed by a law qfnature. These are exceptionless 
generalizations that reflect the ultimate causal structure of the world. It is customary in 
philosophy to contrast these with “accidental generalizations”, which happen to be true 
but might have been false. For example, suppose in all the history of the world there has 
been just one green-eyed mathematician named “Bartholemew”, and there will never be 
another one. Suppose Bartholemew disliked coffee. Then it is true that every green-eyed 
mathematician named “Bartholemew” dislikes coffee. But this is only accidentally true, 
and is not a law of nature. Accidental generalizations do not support causal connections. 
For example, renaming a green-eyed mathematician “Bartholemew” will not cause him to 
dislike coffee. 
Laws of nature entail ordinary universal generalizations, but not every universal 
generalization counts as a law of nature. There is an extensive philosophical literature 
on the topic of laws of nature, but this is not the place to review it. I will simply assume 
the account given in [33]. Laws of nature can be formulated using nomic generalizations. 
These relate predicates and relations, and can be expressed in the form “‘Any A would be 
a B”. Where cp and B are open formulas, we can write the nomic generalization “Any cp 
would be a 8” as “C+O =+ 0”. ‘=$’ is a variable-binding operator, binding all free occurrences 
of variables in (p and 0. Let us define the modal operators Op and 0, of “physical 
possibility” and “physical necessity” by taking O/, P to mean that P is logically consistent 
with the set of all true nomic generalizations, and 0, P to mean --0,-P. ‘0,’ turns out 
to be an S5 modal operator. Let XI, , xn be the variables having free occurrences in cp 
and H. It can be shown that if 0P3xt,. . , x,q then cp =+ Q iff q ,Vxt, . . . ,x,(q 1 t3).j” 
If Op3xt, . , x,cp holds, the generalization cp =+ 8 is said to be “non-counterlegal”. In 
X0 This is all shown in [33] 
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planning, we are only interested in non-counterlegal generalizations, because we are only 
interested in generalizations concerning goals and subgoals that could actually be achieved. 
What appears to be crucial to the nomic generalizations that can be used for the kind 
of causal reasoning that occurs in the Frame Problem is that there are built-in temporal 
references in p and 8 and q is about earlier times than 0. xl This is required for us to be able 
to do the causal reasoning by performing temporal projections in chronological order. In 
[38], I explored the logical structure of causal reasoning employing nomic generalizations 
of the form 
{(A-at-t & C-at-t) =+ (3S)G-thr-oughout-(t + E, t + E + S]}.” ((3 
This says that performing A when C is true is causally sufficient for making G true after 
an interval E. (CS) takes account of the fact that causation can take time, a fact that has 
been heretofore ignored in this paper. (In effect, I have been assuming that E = 0.) The 
interval (t + E, t + E + 61 is open on the left and closed on the right. 33 Consequently, (CS) 
does not allow us to infer deductively that G is true at any particular time--only that it is 
true at some time succeeding t + E. However, if G is temporally-projectible, TEMPORAL- 
PROJECTION allows us to go on to infer defeasibly that G is true at any time succeeding 
t + E. I will take planning-conditionals to have the form of (CS), abbreviating (CS) as 
(A/SG) ws G. When E = 0, I will omit it, writing just ‘w’. 
To make it clear how planning depends upon temporal projection, I will make the 
temporal reference explicit in a plan-step. Rather than just writing the plan-step as “A”, 
I will write it as “A-at-t”, where t is either a real number (designating a time) or a 
variable. Then I will take the ordering-constraints in a plan to be ordering-constraints on 
the time designators rather than the plan-steps themselves. So, for instance, when we use 
the planning-conditionals (A/C) l E SG and (AL/SC) N,* G to construct a plan with a 
causal-link A-at-t1 -+ SG-at-t2 --+ A*-at-t2 + G-at-t3, the ordering-constraints that must 
beaddedtotheplanare{tl+&<q,q+&*<t3). 
The solution to a planning problem is a set of actions and constraints on the times 
those actions are performed such that causal reasoning of the sort involved in the Yale 
Match-Lighting Problem will enable us to infer defeasibly that the goal will be true at the 
desired time. In effect, a plan corresponds to a defeasible causal argument, and the planning 
problem is to find premises for such an argument from which we can infer defeasibly that 
the desired goal will be true. Note that the argument corresponding to the plan nowhere 
mentions the plan itself. The argument is just about actions and their consequences. The 
plan is an artifact of the way in which we go about finding appropriate premises for the 
argument. Finding the premises is a difficult problem, and standard planning procedures 
solve that problem by introducing plans as structures and reasoning about them. 34 
Thus far I have been assuming that an action A is performed at an instant t, and that a 
planning conditional will require C to be true at that same instant. However, realistically, 
most actions must be performed over an interval rather than at an instant. Performing the 
31 See Pollock [36,38] for more detail about the exact form of these temporal references. 
32 G-thmuglzout-[t, *] is defined to mean (Vx)[t -C x = t* > G-at-t]. 
33 That is, it is the set of real numbers x such that t + E c x < t + 6 + 6. 
j4 SATPLAN [20] is an exception to this. See the discussion of SATPLAN in Section 12. 
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action is a process that takes time, and C may be required at some intermediate point in 
that process rather than at the beginning of the process. For instance, think of serving the 
ball in tennis. One must first throw the ball into the air so that it will arrive at a point x at 
a time t. Then one swings the tennis racket so that it will hit the ball at point x at time t. 
But one must begin the swing earlier than time t. So the ball’s being at point x is required 
midway through the performance of the swing-action rather at the beginning. This can be 
accommodated by employing more complex planning-conditionals having the logical form 
{ (A*-at-t & SG-at-t +(Y) =+ (36)G-throughout-(t + E. t + F + 61). 
Employing this in place of (A*/SG) w,* G in the above planning example will produce 
a plan with the causal-link A-at-t1 + SG-at-t2 -+ A*-at-t3 -+ G-at-t4 and the ordering- 
constraints {tl + F < t2, t;! = t3 + a, t3 + E* < t4}. To avoid unnecessary complexity, for 
the bulk of this paper I will not consider planning with these more complex planning- 
conditionals, confining myself to the use of planning-conditionals of the form (CS) with 
E = 0. However, the theory can be readily extended to handle these more complex 
conditionals, and I will return to this topic briefly in Section 11 and discuss how to do it. 
6. Planning and temporal-projectibility 
The conventional theory of goal-regression planning as developed in Section 2 was based 
upon the Soundness Assumption, which was formulated as follows: 
Soundness Assumption. A linear plan will achieve a goal G relative to a state start-state 
iff G is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by its plan-steps relative to start-state 
and the set of all true planning-conditionals. 
This employs the concept of a result of a sequence of actions, which was defined in (Rl). 
To make the temporal reference explicit, let us rewrite (Rl) as follows: 
(RI) Where start-state is a state of affairs, conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, 
and to < I . -c t,+ 1 is a sequence of times, P-at-t,,+ 1 is a result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . , 
AR-at-t,,) relative to start-state and conditionals iff either: 
(i) n = 0 and P-at-to is true in start-state; or 
(ii) n > 0 and conditionals contains a conditional (A,/C) F P such that C-at-t,, 
is a result of (Al-at-t], . . . , A,-I-at-t,_I); or 
(iii) n > 0, P-at-t,, is a result of (AI-at-t1 , . . _ , A,_ 1 -at-t,_ I), and conditionals 
does not contain a conditional of the form (A,z/C) l k Q such that Q is 
either P or a conjunct of P and C-at-t,, is a result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . . , A,_, -at- 
6-l ); or 
(iv) n > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is a conjunction whose conjuncts are results of 
(AI-at-t], . , An-at-t,). 
The observations of Section 5 require modifications to both the Soundness Assumption 
itself and to the definition of “result”, and these in turn require modifications to the 
rules of goal-regression planning that are based upon the Soundness Assumption. First, 
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the inferences underlying the definition of “result” are only defeasible inferences, based 
upon TEMPORAL-PROJECTION. As such, the term “result” is a misnomer. We are not 
characterizing what will definitely happen if the action-sequence is performed. We are 
just characterizing what can be reasonably (and defeasibly) expected to happen. More 
precisely, we are characterizing the set of warranted expectations, in the sense of 
Section 4. So it would be better to use the term “expectable-result”. Second, because 
the inferences are based upon TEMPORAL-PROJECTION, they are subject to temporal- 
projectibility constraints. We must make some changes to the definition to accommodate 
these constraints. 
Clause (i) tells us to expect P-at-t1 to be true if P-at-to is true. This is just an instance of 
TEMPORAL-PROJECTION. Accordingly, it requires the addition of a temporal-projectibility 
constraint on P: 
(i) n = 0, P is temporally-projectible, and P-at-to is true in start-state. 
It follows that PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN also requires a temporal-projectibility constraint: 
PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving goal-at-t, if goal-at-to is true where 
to < t, infer defeasibly that a null-plan will achieve goal-ut-t 
Note that PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN becomes a defeasible inference-rule, because it builds in 
anapplicationof TEMPORAL-PROJECTION. 
Clause (iv) requires no modification to accommodate temporal-projectibility, because it 
only concerns relations between expectable-results that have already been projected for- 
ward to the appropriate times, and hence does not presuppose any new application of 
TEMPORAL-PROJECTION. However, clauses (ii) and (iii) require temporal-projectibility 
constraints, 
6. I. Goul regression 
Clause (ii) describes causal inferences of the sort to which the Frame Problem is rel- 
evant. If we can expect C-at-t, to be achieved by executing the sequence of actions 
(Al-at-tl,..., A,_,-at-&I), then given the conditional (An/C) w P we can infer that for 
some time t” between tn and &+I, and P-at-t* will be made true by performing A,-at-t,, . 
If P is temporally-projectible, we can then infer by temporal projection that P will still be 
true at tn+l . For this reasoning to work, a projectibility constraint must be added to clause 
(ii): 
(ii) n > 0, P is temporally-projectible, and condition& contains a conditional 
(An/C) N P such that C-at-t,, is an expectable-result of (Al-at-tl, . . . , A,_!-ut- 
tn_l) and tn+l > t,,. 
GOAL-REGRESSION is based directly on clause (ii), so it must contain a corresponding 
constraint, and it becomes defeasible: 
GOAL-REGRESSION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving G-at-t, if G is temporally-projectible, 
adopt interest in finding planning-conditionals (A/C) l G having G as their consequent. 
Given such a conditional, adopt an interest in finding a plan for achieving C-at-t*. If it is 
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concluded that a plan subplan will achieve C-at-t*, construct a plan by (1) adding a new 
step to the end of subplan where the new step prescribes the action A-at-t’, (2) adding 
the constraint (t* < t) to the ordering-constraints of subplan, and (3) adjusting the 
causal-links appropriately. Infer defeasibly that the new plan will achieve G-at-t. 
Similar constraints are required in EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION and EMBEDDED- 
NULL-PLAN. 
6.2. Undermining causal-links 
Clause (iii) is, in effect, a statement of TEMPORAL-PROJECTION applied to the 
expectable-results of an action-sequence, together with the statement of a defeater for the 
application of TEMPORAL-PROJECTION. For TEMPORAL-PROJECTION to be applicable, 
we must require that P be temporally-projectible. Given that constraint, if it is defeasibly 
reasonable to expect P to be true after executing Al-at-tl, . . . , A,_,-at-t,_, , then it 
is defeasibly reasonable to expect P to remain true after executing An-at-t, as well. 
A defeater for this defeasible expectation consists of having a reason for thinking that 
P-at-t,, will not be true. Given that it is defeasibly reasonable to expect C to be true 
after executing A 1 -at-t1 , . . . , A,,_1 -at-t,_, , it follows in accordance with the preceding 
discussion that, given the conditional (A,/ C) l -Q, it is defeasibly reasonable to expect 
Q to become false at some time t* after executing A,-at-t,, where t* > t,,. If Q’s being 
false requires P to be false, then as in the Yale Match-Lighting Problem, this defeats 
the temporal projection to the conclusion that P will still be true at t,,+l. Note that 
this reasoning does not require that -Q be temporally-projectible. So (iii) should be 
reformulated as follows: 
(iii) n > 0, P-at-t,, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (Al-at-tl, . . . , 
A,_I-ut-&_I), and conditionals does not contain a conditional of the form 
(An/C) l - Q such that Q is either P or a conjunct of P, C-at-t,, is an expectable- 
result of (A, -at-t1 , . . . , A,_l-at-&-l), and &+I > t,,. 
Clause (iii) underlies the defeat of SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL by finding that the 
merged plan undermines one of its own causal-links. It follows that in the search for 
embellishments, the same projectibility-constraints must be observed as in the original 
search for plans. 
Clause (iii) also underlies CONFRONTATION, but CONFRONTATION is correct as 
previously formulated. The observation that in clause (iii) -Q need not be temporally- 
projectible is an important one. In CONFRONTATION, we search for a plan for --subgoal 
(or for the negation of a conjunct of subgoal). We know that subgoal will be temporally- 
projectible, but there is no reason to expect its negation to be. 
Combining these observations, we are led to the following definition of “expectable- 
result”: 
(R2) Where start-state is a state of affairs, conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, 
and to < . . . -c tn+l is a sequence of times, P-at-t,,+1 is an expectable-result of 
(A1 -at-t1 , . . , A,,-at-t,,) relative to start-state and conditionals iff either: 
(i) n = 0, P is temporally-projectible, and P-ar-to is true in start-state; or 
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(ii) n > 0, P is temporally-projectible, and conditionals contains a conditional 
(A,,/C) N P such that C-at-t, is an expectable-result of (A I-at-t1 , . . . , A,_ t - 
at-&_I) and &+I > tn; or 
(iii) n > 0, P-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . , 
A,_1 -at-t,z_l ), and conditionals does not contain a conditional of the form 
(An/C) ’ -Q such that Q is either P or a conjunct of P, C-at-t,, is an 
expectable-result of (Al-at-tl, . , A,,_,-at-&_I), and tn+t > tn; or 
(iv) n > 0 and P-at-tll+l is a conjunction whose conjuncts are expectable-results 
of (Al-at-t{, . . . , A,-at-t,). 
The Soundness Assumption must now be reinterpreted as giving us merely a defeasible 
expectation that a plan will achieve its goal: 
Soundness Assumption. Executing a linear plan can be defeasibly expected to achieve a 
goal G relative to a state start-state iff G is an expectable-result of the sequence of actions 
prescribed by the plan-steps of the plan relative to start-state and the set of all warranted 
planning-conditionals. 
6.3. The importance of the temporal-projectibility constraints 
It is of some interest to illustrate the importance of the temporal-projectibility con- 
straints. They have significant impacts on goal-regression planning. Suppose Cl, Cz, C3, 
and Dt are temporally-projectible, we know that Cl-at-to and Dl-at-to are true, and 
we are given the planning-conditionals (Al/Cl) N C2, (A2/C2) N Gl, (A2/C3) N GI, 
(A3/D1) w G2 and (A3/Dl) w -Cl. Suppose our goal is (Gl & G2)-at-t. We can con- 
struct plan #1 (Fig. 3) for G 1 -at-t, and plan #2 (Fig. 4) for Gz-at-t: To construct a plan for 
the conjunctive goal (G 1 & G2)-at-t, we merge plans #I and #2 to produce plan #3 (Fig. 5). 
We must then investigate whether plan #3 undermines one of its own causal-links. 
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Fig. 5. Plan #3. 
(3), which is not ordered with respect to plan-steps (1) and (2), undermines the causal- 
link (1) + Cl-at-t2 + (2) --+ Gl-at-t. The plan can be repaired by adding an ordering- 
constraint requiring plan-step (3) to be executed either before plan-step (1) or after plan- 
step (2), producing plan #4 (Fig. 6). 
Now, suppose we ignore the temporal-projectibility constraints. From (Al/Cl) N C2 
we can deduce (Al/Cl) l (C2 v C3), and from (A2/C2) l GI and (A2/C3) l Cl we 
can deduce the conditional (A2/(C2 v C3)) l G1. 35 Without the temporal-projectibility 
constraints, we could construct plan #5 (Fig. 7) for Cl-at-t: To construct a plan for the 
conjunctive goal (Gl & G2)-at-t, we merge plans #5 and #2 to produce plan #6 (Fig. 8). 
Note that plans #5 and #6 differ from plans #l and #3 only in their causal-links. They 
prescribe the same actions in the same order. Now when we investigate whether plan #6 
x5 This planning-conditional violates the syntactical constraint that he precondition bea conjunction ofliterals, 
but such syntactical constraints can always be circumvented by simply introducing a new atomic formula 
equivalent to (C, v Cg). The relaxation of the syntactical constraints will he explored in the next section. 
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Fig. 7. Plan #5 
undermines one of its own causal-links, we find that, unlike plan #3, it does not. This is 
because the conditional (A3/Dt) l WC:! does not entail (A3/Dt) l --(C2 v C3). Thus 
without the projectibility-constraints, we would be led to adopt plan #6, whose execution 
is the same as plan #3. But as we have seen, plan #3 cannot be expected to achieve its goal. 
If step (3) is executed between steps (1) and (2), the plan will fail. The execution of plan 
#6 is precisely the same as the execution of plan #3, so it cannot be expected to achieve its 
goal either, but this is not revealed by looking for undermined causal-links. 
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Fig. 8. Plan #6. 
7. Relaxing the syntactical constraints 
Once the account of Section 2 is modified as indicated in Section 6, it constitutes 
a provably correct theory of goal-regression planning provided all goals and planning- 
conditionals satisfy the syntactical constraint that goals and subgoals must be literals or 
conjunctions of literals. But now it is time to re-examine both that constraint and the 
definition of “expectable-result”. 
There is something artificial about the definition (R2) of “expectable-result”. It ought 
to be the case that logical consequences of expectable-results are expectable-results. This 
suggests revising the previous definition (R2) as follows: 
(R3) Where start-state is a state of affairs, conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, 
and to < . . K tn+l is a sequence of times, P-at-t,,+] is an expectable-result of 
(AI-at-tl,..., An-at-t,,) relative to start-state and conditionals iff either: 
(i) IZ = 0, P is temporally-projectible, and P-at-to is true in start-state; or 
(ii) n > 0, P is temporally-projectible, and conditionals contains a conditional 
(A,/C) > P such that C-at-t, is an expectable-result of (Al-at-tl, . , A,_,- 
at-t,_l) and tn+l > tn; or 
(iii) n > 0, P-at-t,, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . , 
A,,_, -at-&_I), and conditionals does not contain a conditional of the form 
(4/C) l -Q such that Q is either P or a conjunct of P, C-at-t, is an 
expectable-result of (AI-ut-tl, . . , A,_1-at-t,_~), and tn+l > tn; or 
(iv) n > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is a logical consequence of expectable-results of 
(A1-at-tl, . . , An-at-t,). 
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If we assume that the compactness theorem 36 holds for the logical consequence relation 
(as it does, e.g., in first-order logic, but not in second-order logic), this definition can be 
written equivalently as follows: 
(R4) Where start-state is a state of affairs, conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, 
and to < . . . < &+I is a sequence of times, P-at-t,+1 is an expectable-result of
(A1 -at-tl, . . , An-at-t,) relative to start-state and conditionals iff either: 
(i) II = 0, P is temporally-projectible, and P-at-to is true in start-state; or 
(ii) II > 0, P is temporally-projectible, and conditionals contains a conditional 
(A,/C) l P such that C-at-t,, is an expectable-result of (A1 -at-tl, . . . , A,_, - 
at-t,_l) and tn+l > tn; or 
(iii) IZ > 0, P-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . . , 
A,,_, -at-t,- I), and conditionals does not contain a conditional of the form 
(An/C) l -Q such that Q is either P or a conjunct of P, C-at-t,, is an 
expectable-result of (Al-at-tl, . , A,_,-at-t,_l), and tn+l > tn; or 
(iv) n > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is a conjunction whose conjuncts are expectable-results 
of (Al-at-tl, . . , A,-at-t,); or 
(v) n > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is a logical consequence of some expectable-result of 
(Al-at-tl, .. . , An-at-t,). 
It is worth noting that even if the logical consequence relation is not compact, these two 
definitions will give rise to the same planning because, presumably, we can only plan for 
finitely many subgoals in the course of any planning problem. For this reason, I will focus 
on the latter definition of “expectable-result”. 
Thus far we have required goals and subgoals to be conjunctions of literals. If we identify 
the logical consequence relation with first-order consequence, and we restrict our attention 
to conjunctions of literals, then the definitions (R2), (R3), and (R4) are all equivalent. This 
is a justification for the using (Rl) in the “conventional” theory of goal-regression planning, 
and it carries over to using (R2) in the present theory. However, we can reasonably object 
both to these syntactical constraints and to the identification of logical consequence with 
first-order consequence. 
7.1. Problems with liter& 
First, consider the syntactical constraints. Initially, it may seem that they constitute a way 
of incorporating the temporal-projectibility constraint. Unfortunately, this simple approach 
to the problem does not work, for several reasons: 
l The fact that something is symbolized by an atomic formula does not imply anything 
about whether it is projectible. Anything can be symbolized as an atomic formula, 
including wildly unprojectible logical compounds. We might try to get around this by 
requiring that atomic formulas express “logically simple” propositions. Unfortunately, 
not everyone agrees that this notion makes sense. It is often alleged that logical form 
belongs only to sentences, not propositions. 
36 The compactness theorem says that if a formula is a logical consequence of a set X of formulas, it is also a 
logical consequence of some finite subset of X. 
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l Even if the notion of a logically simple proposition does make sense, it is doubtful 
that all logically simple propositions will be temporally-projectible. For example, “the 
time is now 3 PM” might plausibly be regarded as logically simple, but its being true 
now is no reason to think it will still be true an hour from now. 
l We might build into the semantics of our language the restriction that atomic formulas 
express temporally-projectible logically simple propositions. That, however, does not 
guarantee that the negation of an atomic formula will be temporally-projectible. We 
have seen that negations of temporally-projectible propositions are not automatically 
temporally-projectible, and that is true even for what are presumably logically simple 
propositions. The example given above was “X is red’. Thus there will still be 
no guarantee that literals will be temporally-projectible. Furthermore, this would 
seem to preclude our being able to express temporally-unprojectible logically simple 
propositions like “the time is now 3 PM”. 
l Not all logically complex propositions are temporally-unprojectible. Requiring that 
goals and subgoals be conjunctions of literals will rule out logically complex 
propositions that, intuitively, are perfectly fine objects of goal-regression planning. 
This will be illustrated in the next paragraph. 
It must be concluded that the restriction to conjunctions of literals is artificial and should 
be eliminated. Temporal-projectibility is a semantical notion and cannot be captured by 
syntax alone. 
7.2. Problems withjrst-order consequence 
Logical consequence cannot be identified with first-order consequence. Let us consider 
a particularly simple example of this, which simultaneously illustrates the importance of 
temporally-projectible formulas that are logically complex. Nomic generalizations cannot 
change truth value as time passes. They are fixed features of the world. Thus they are 
temporally-projectible. Furthermore, there cannot be true planning-conditionals whose 
consequents are the negations of true nomic generalizations. Thus it follows from (R4) 
that any true nomic generalization is an expectable-result of any action-sequence. Now 
consider a non-counterlegal nomic generalization (Fx + Gx). This entails (but is not 
entailed by) (Vx)(Fx > Gx). Consequently, [Fa & (Fx j Gx)] entails Ga, but this is 
not a first-order implication. It can, however, be an important implication for planning. If 
our goal is Ga, one way to achieve that goal is to achieve the subgoal Fa. 
More generally, let us define: 
P nomicully implies Q iff there is a set r of true nomic generalizations such that 
r U (P} entails Q. 
If the logical-consequence relation in (R4) is construed sufficiently broadly to include the 
entailments employed in the definition of nomic implication, it follows as above that if P 
is an expectable-result of an action-sequence and the planning agent is able to reason to 
the warranted conclusion that P nomically implies Q, then Q is also an expectable-result. 
It will be syntactically convenient to abbreviate “the planning agent is able to reason to the 
warranted conclusion that P nomically implies Q” as “P is known to nomically imply Q”, 
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but it must be acknowledge that this is not a literal use of “known”. Then we can express 
(R4) equivalently as follows: 
(R5) Where start-state is a state of affairs, conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, 
and to < . < tn+l is a sequence of times, P-at-t,+, is an expectable-result of 
(Al -at-tl, . . , An-at-t,) relative to start-state and conditionals iff either: 
(i) n = 0, P is temporally-projectible, and P-at-to is true in start-state; or 
(ii) n > 0, P is temporally-projectible, and conditionals contains a conditional 
(A,/ C) l P such that C-at-t, is an expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . . , A,,_ I- 
at-t,_l) and tn+l > tn; or 
(iii) II > 0, P-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . . , 
A,_,-at-t,_,), and conditionals does not contain a conditional of the form 
(L/C) l -Q such that Q is either P or a conjunct of P, C-at-t, is an 
expectable-result of (Al-at-tl, . . . , A,_,-at-&_I), and &+I > tn; or 
(iv) n > 0 and P-at-t,,+, is a conjunction whose conjuncts are expectable-results 
of (Al-at-tl, . ., A,-&-&); or 
(v) n > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is a logical consequence of some expectable-result of 
(Al-at-tl.. . , An-at-t,); or 
(vi) n > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is known to be nomically implied by some expectable- 
result of (A 1 -at-tl, . , A,-&-&,). 
Logical consequence is the limiting case of nomic implication, so clause (v) is redundant 
in (R5), but it will be useful to keep it in the definition. 37 
7.3. Collective undermining 
Should (R5) be adopted as our final definition of “expectable-result”? No, because 
relaxing the syntactical constraints has the effect of making clause (iii) unreasonable. 
Clause (iii) plays a double role. It tells us that we can defeasibly project an expectable- 
result P forwards through the plan, and it tells us when the structure of the plan blocks that 
projection. According to clause (iii), the projection becomes unreasonable only when later 
steps of the plan can be expected to make P false (i.e., undermine it). However, having now 
allowed planning-conditionals to have consequents of arbitrary logical form, the possibility 
arises that the consequent of a planning-conditional might be the negation of a conjunction, 
-( P1 & . . & P,), of previously expectable-results. In accordance with the reasoning 
resolving the Frame Problem, we can infer that the consequent is true, and hence one of 
these previously expectable-results will not obtain. But we have no way of determining 
which it is that will not obtain, so we should be agnostic and refrain from concluding of 
any of them that it will obtain. 38 In other words, they all cease to be expectable-results. 
This is a kind of collective undermining. 
This point can be made logically more rigorous as follows. Suppose PI, . , Pn 
are expectable-results of (A1 -at-tl, . . , A,z_l-at-t,_l), but we have a planning-con- 
37 1 assume that the set of warranted conclusions is closed under logical consequence. so clause (v) need not be 
restricted to known logical consequences. 
38 Technically, in the logic of defeasible reasoning this is a case of collective defeat. 
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ditional (A,/C) F -(PI & . & P,) such that C-at-t, is an expectable-result of 
(A,-at-tl, . . A,_l-at-&_I). By clause (ii), -(PI & . . & Pn) is an expectable- 
result of (Al-at-tl, . , A,-&-&). We can infer that each Pi is an expectable-result 
of (Al-at-~,..., A,-&-&), and then by clause (iv) we get that (PI & ... & Pn) is 
an expectable-result of (A I -c&t], . . , A,-at-t,,). So we have a contradiction being an 
expectable-result, and then by clause (v), everything becomes an expectable-result. 
(R5) must be revised. We do not want (PI & . . . & P,) to be an expectable-result 
of (Al-at-t], . . . , A,2-ut-t,), and the only way to deny that is to deny that the Pi’s are 
expectable-results of (A 1 -at-t], . , A,, -at-t,). The projection of the Pi’s must be blocked 
by our having the planning conditional (A,, /C) w -(PI & . & P,), where C-at-t, is an 
expectable-result of (A 1 -u&t I . . . . , A,? _ 1 -a?-r,, _ 1). In other words, we must have collective 
undermining. 
This suggests revising clause (iii) as follows (where LrX is the conjunction of a set X of 
propositions): 
IZ > 0. P-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . . , A,_ I- 
at-t,_ I), and conditionals does not contain a conditional of the form (A,, / C) k -l7X 
such that C-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (Al-at-~, . . , 
A,_ 1 -ut-t,z_l ), tn+l > t,,, and X is a set of temporally-projectible expectable-results 
of (Al-at-t], . . . , A,_l-at-t,_l), one of which is P. 
This will not quite do, however. The difficulty is that it follows from the logic of nomic 
generalizations that if (A,/C) l -l7X then for any P. (A,/C) w -n(X U {PI). That is, 
you can always weaken the consequent of a nomic generalization by adding disjuncts. Thus 
(iii), as revised above, would result in every previously expectable-result being defeated if 
any is. To avoid this we must require that X be a minimal conjunction of expectable-results: 
(iii) n > 0, P-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . , A,_ I- 
at-t,_]), and if conditionals contains a conditional of the form (An/C) N -l7X 
such that C-at-t,, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A1 -at-t1 , . , 
A,_1 -at-&_I), &+I > tn, X is a set of temporally-projectible expectable-results 
of (Al-at-t], . . , A,_]-at-t,_l), and P E X, then there is a conditional (An/C*) w 
-l7Xo in conditionals such that C*-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable- 
result of (A 1 -at-t], . . . . A,_l-ut-t,z_l). X0 2 X, and P +! X0. 
With this change, we can produce what seems to be an adequate definition of “expectable- 
result”: 
(R6) Where start-state is a state of affairs, conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, 
and to -=z . . . < tn+l is a sequence of times, P-at-t,+1 is an expectable-result of 
(Al-at-tl,..., A,-at-t,) relative to start-state and conditionals iff either: 
(i) n = 0, P is temporally-projectible, and P-at-to is true in start-state; or 
(ii) n > 0, P is temporally-projectible, and conditionals contains a conditional 
(A,/C) N P such that C-at-t, is an expectable-result of (A1 -at-t], . . . , 
A,_]-at-t,_]) and tn+l > tn; or 
(iii) n > 0, P-at-t,, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t] , . , 
A,_1 -at-t,_] ), and if conditionals contains a conditional of the form 
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result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . , A,_ 1 -at-t,- I), tn+l > t,, , X is a set of temporally- 
projectible expectable-results of (A1 -at-t] , . , A,_1 -at-t,_ I), and P E X, 
then there is a conditional (A,/C*) N -l7Xo in conditionals such that C*-at- 
t,, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t], . . . , A,_, -at- 
&-l), X0 2 X, and P $ X0; or 
II > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is a conjunction whose conjuncts are expectable-results 
of (Al-at-tl, . . , A,-&-&); or 
n > 0 and P-at-t,+] is a logical consequence of some expectable-result of 
(Al-at-tl, . . . , An-at-t,); or 
n > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is known to be nomically implied by some expectable- 
result of (AI-at-tl, . . . . A,-at-t,). 
8. Revised rules for goal-regression planning 
If we add to (R6) the following definition of “expectable-result” for partial-order plans: 
P is an expectable-result of a partial-order plan iff it is an expectable-result of every 
linearization of the plan. 
This provides a semantics for goal-regression planning. We can then look for a set of proce- 
dures for constructing plans and attempt o prove the soundness and completeness of the set 
of procedures. The procedures described in sections two and five provide the starting point 
for the construction of a sound and complete set of procedures for goal-regression planning. 
They must be modified somewhat o accommodate the differences between (R6) and (R2). 
8. I. Planning for implacandu 
There are two differences between (R2) and (R6)-(R6) introduces collective under- 
mining, and it includes expectable-results that are logically or nomically implied by other 
expectable-results. Let us focus on the latter difference first. (R2) recognized just one case 
of expectable-results being derived logically from other expectable-results. That was the 
case in which a conjunction is achieved by achieving its conjuncts. Such logical deriva- 
tions were recorded in plans by including multiple goals and subgoals in a causal-link. We 
can extend the use of causal-links by allowing causal-links of the form n t + subgoal, + 
. . . -+ subgoal,, -+ n:! + goal, + . . -+ goal,, where the relationship between subgoal, 
and subgoali+, or goali and godi+ l is one of logical entailment or nomic implication. 
To accommodate this, we can begin with the three basic rules of goal-regression planning, 
PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN, GOAL-REGRESSION, and SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL. To these 
we add one new rule: 
PLAN-FOR-IMPLICANDAx9 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving goal, and given a nomic implication 
subgoal + goal, adopt an interest in finding a plan for achieving subgoal. If a plan 
38 In traditional logic, if P implies Q. P is the impficam and Q the impficandum. 
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subplan is proposed for achieving subgoal, construct a new plan by replacing each 
causal-link n + subgoal, -+ . + subgoal,, -+ *jnish* + goal, -+ . . . + goal, + 
subgoal of .subplan by the causal-link n -+ subgoal, -+ . + subgoal, + *$nish* + 
goal, + . + goal, -+ subgoal + goal. Infer defeasibly that the new plan will 
achieve goal. 
A special case of this rule occurs when the nomic implication is a logical entailment. 
As formulated, PLAN-FOR-IMPLICANDA is a computational nightmare. It makes 
planning much more difficult. However, it turns out that all but one special case of this 
rule can be eliminated. This can be seen by reflecting on the causal-link structure of plans 
that result from its use. Consider the following cases: 
We never need a structure of the form 
L 
Qfl 
(P&Q)-, R+ S-n 
2 




(P&Q)+ S-+ n2 




(P&Q)-+ S+n2+ R 
because if (P & Q) =+- S and (A & S) =+ R, we also have (A & (P & Q)) 3 R, and so 
can build a plan with the simpler structure 
c4 
Q” 
(P&Q)* n2+ R 




s> (R&S)+ n2+ G 
because if (P & Q) + R and (A & (R & S)) + G, we also have (A & ((P & Q) & S)) + 
G, and so can build a plan with the simpler structure 
P 
; P&Q), 
Q ,,((P&Q)&S)+ n2-’ G 
We never need a structure of the form 
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because if (A & P) + Q and Q + R then (A & P) + R, and so we can build a plan with 
the simpler structure 
P+nz-+R 
We never need a structure of the form 
*start* --+ Q + R 
because if Q is true and Q =+ R then R is true, and hence we can build a plan with the 
simpler structure 
*start* -+ R 
Only one case remains. Where goal is the ultimate goal of the planning exercise (not just a 
subgoal generated in the course of the planning), a structure of the form 
n1-, P 
n2+ Q 
> 0’ & Q)+goal 
cannot be eliminated. So a restriction can be imposed on PLAN-FOR-IMPLICANDA 
allowing its use only as the first step of the plan search. 
It is clear that further restrictions must be imposed on PLAN-FOR-IMPLICANDA to make 
its application efficient. For example, given an interest in finding a plan for achieving G, 
we do not want to automatically adopt interest in finding plans for achieving every goal of 
the form (G & P) for arbitrary P. However, I will not pursue this point here. 
8.2. Collective undermining 
As before, an application of SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL produces a plan which may 
undermine some of its own causal-links. We must adopt rules to search for underminings 
and repair them if possible. Now, however, undermining becomes more complicated 
because relaxing the syntactical constraints gives rise to collective undermining. To work 
out the logical details of this, let us revise the definition of presumptive-soundness as 
follows: 
A plan is presumptively-sound relative to a set conditionals of planning-conditionals 
and a state start-state iff 
(1) where goal is the goal of the plan, the plan contains a causal-link nl + 
subgoal1 -+ . + subgoal,, + goal + *finish* + goal, and 
(2) for every causal-link n1 -+ subgoal1 + . . . + subgoal, -+ n2 + goal1 + . . . -+ 
goal, of the plan: 
(a) if n # 1, then for each i such that 1 < i < n, either: 
(i) subgoali+l is a conjunction, subgoali is one of its conjunct& and the 
plan also contains a causal-link nT + subgoae;’ + . . . -+ subgoaq + 
subgoali+l -+ . . --+ subgoal,, + n$ + goal, -+ . . + goal,, where 
subgoaq is the other conjunct of subgoali+, ; or 
(ii) subgoali+ 1 is nomically implied by subgoali ; 
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(b) if m # 1, then for each i such that 1 6 i -e m, either: 
(i) goa~~+~ is a conjunction, goali is one of its conjuncts, and the plan 
also contains a causal-link nT + subgoal1 + . . . -+ subgoal,, --+ nz + 
goaq + . . . -+ . . . --f goal; + goa&+, + . . + goal,,, where goaq is 
the other conjunct of goali+ 1; or 
(ii) goaZi+l is nomically implied by goali ; 
(c) if n, = *start* then subgoal1 is true in start-state; 
(d) if n2 # *$nish* then if A is the action of n2, “(A/subgoal,) l goal,” is a 
member of conditionals; 
(e) if 121 # *start* then the plan contains a causal-link ng -+ subgoal;f + . + 
subgoal$ -+ n4 + goal; + . . -+ goal*,, -+ subgoalI; 
(f) n 1 is ordered before n2 by the ordering-constraints of the plan; and 
(g) subgoal,, is temporally-projectible. 
To accommodate collective undermining, let us define: 
A plan-step IZ of a plan collectively undermines a causal-link nl + subgoal1 -+ 
. . . -+ subgoal,, + n2 -+ goal, + . . . + goal,,, iff there is a linearization of the plan 
such that: 
(i) n occurs between n1 and n2, 
(ii) there is a set X of temporally-projectible expectable-results of the sequence of 
actions prescribed by the plan-steps preceding n in the linearization such that: 
(a) subgoal1 E X; 
(b) -I7X is an expectable-result of the sequence of actions prescribed by the 
plan-steps *start*, . , n in the linearization; 
(c) there is no X0 such that X0 c X, subgoal, +! X0, and -I7Xo is an expectable- 
result of the sequence of actions prescribed by the plan-steps *start*, . . , n in 
the linearization. 
Given a causal-link nl + subgoal1 -+ . . -+ subgoal,, -+ n2 + goal1 + . . . + goal,, 
let n 1 be its root, n2 its target, and subgoal1 its initialsubgoal. The most manageable case 
of collective undermining occurs when the set X is a set of initial subgoals of causal-links. 
Let us define: 
A plan-step s of a plan collectively undermines a set C of causal-links iff there is a 
linearization of the plan such that: 
(i) s occurs between the root and the target of each member of C; 
(ii) the initial-subgoal of each member of L: is temporally-projectible; 
(iii) the negation of the conjunction of the initial-subgoals of members of C is 
an expectable-result of the sequence of actions prescribed by the plan-steps 
*start*, . , s in the linearization; 
(iv) there is no set ~5* of causal-links of plan such that C* c C and the negation 
of the conjunction of the initial-subgoals of members of L* is an expectable- 
result of the sequence of actions prescribed by the plan-steps *start*, . . , s in the 
linearization. 
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To illustrate with a contrived example, consider a game in which you throw a ball at a target 
mounted on a wall, and then the ball falls into one of two buckets. I am a good enough 
pitcher to be able to hit the target reliably, but not good enough to be able to determine 
into which bucket the ball will fall. Suppose the buckets are initially empty, and the goal 
is to hit the target and have the buckets both empty. Consider the plan to accomplish 
this by throwing the ball and hitting the target. The causal-links of this plan have 
the form start* + have-ball -+ throw-ball -+ hit-target,start* -+ bucket-#l-empty -+ 
both-buckets-empty + *jinish* + both-buckets-empty, and start* + bucket-#2-empty 
+ both-buckets-empty + ynish* + both-buckets-empty. This is obviously not a good 
plan, because although the buckets are initially empty and throwing the ball will result 
in the target being hit, the ball will then fall into one of the buckets and they will 
not both be empty after all. Given that 1 cannot predict into which bucket the ball 
will fall, no causal-link of the plan is undermined in the sense of Section 2, but the 
set of causal-links consisting of start* + bucket-#l-empty + both-buckets-empty +* 
finish* -+ both-buckets-empty, and start* -+ bucket-#2-empty + both-buckets-empty -+* 
jinish* + both-buckets-empty is collectively undermined in the above sense, and hence 
each member of that set is collectively undermined. 
Unfortunately, not all cases of collective undermining result from collectively under- 
mining a pre-existing set of causal-links. Suppose that in the preceding example my goal 
is simply to hit the target and have bucket#l empty. Again, consider the plan to do that 
by throwing the ball and hitting the target. In this case the plan has just two causal- 
links, *start* -+ have-ball + throw-ball + hit-target and start* -+ bucket-#l-empty + 
*$nish* + bucket-#l-empty. The plan is still not a good plan, because the ball might 
fall into bucket #l. But now the collective undermining of the causal-link start* -+ 
bucket-#l-empty + *finish* + bucket-#l-empty does not result from collectively under- 
mining a set of causal-links. Instead, it results from collectively undermining the set of two 
expectable-results bucket-#l-empty and bucket-#2-empty, only one of which is an initial- 
subgoal of a causal-link in the plan. 
Let us revise the definition of causal-soundness to appeal to collective undermining: 
A plan is causally-sound iff it is presumptively-sound relative to a set of true 
planning-conditionals and the plan does not collectively undermine any of its own 
causal-links. 
We can then prove Theorems 1 and 2 much as before. Let us also define: 
An embellishment plana of plan. presumptively undermines a set of causal-links L: 
of plan iff 
( 1) plan0 is presumptively-sound, 
(2) the goal of plan0 is the negation of the conjunction of the initial-subgoals of 
members of L, 
(3) play, has a single penultimate plan-step s, and 
(4) there is a linearization of plan0 in which s occurs between the root and the target 
of every member of C. 
As illustrated above, the collective undermining of a causal-link need not result from the 
undermining of a set of causal-links, because some of the expectable-results involved in 
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the collective undermining may not be involved in the plan. However, it is always possible 
to extend the plan by adding causal-links to those expectable-results (making them both 
the goal and subgoal of the causal-link), and adding attendant ordering-constraints, so that 
the collective undermining does consist of a undermining of a set of causal-links of the 
extended plan. That produces an embellishment of the plan. We can then prove: 
Theorem 8. A plan plan collectively undermines its causal-link L iff there is an 
embellishment plan+ of plan and a set C of causal-links qf plan+ such that plan+ 
presumptively-undermines C, and 
(1) LEL 
(2) plan-t is causally-sound, and 
(3) there is no embellishment plan0 of plan+ and set L* of causal-links ofplan+ such 
that 
(a) plan0 presumptively-undermines C*, 
(b) C* cl Lc, 
(c) L $ C*, and 
(d) plan0 is causally-sound. 
An immediate corollary of Theorems 1 and 8 is: 
Theorem 9. A plan plan collectively undermines its causal-link L #there is a presumptiv- 
ely-sound embellishment plan+ of plan and a set G qf causal-links of plan+ such that 
plan+ presumptively-undermines C, and 
(1) LEG 
(2) there is no presumptively-sound embellishment plan0 of plan+ and set L* of causal- 
links of plun+ such that 
(a) plan0 presumptively-undermines C*, 
(b) .c* c Cc, 
(c) L 4 L*, and 
(d) piano does not collectively undermine any of its causal-links. 
Translating Theorem 9 into a set of rules for defeating applications of SPLIT-CONJUNCT- 
IVE-GOAL is a bit complicated. The search for defeaters will consist of finding an 
appropriate planning-conditional (A/C) N -L7X, such that 
( I ) A is the action prescribed by some plan-step s, 
(2) the initial-subgoal of some causal-link L is in X, 
(3) the ordering of the plan-steps can be extended so that s occurs between the root and 
target of L, 
(4) an embellishment achieving C can be constructed in such a way that all the plan- 
steps precede s, and 
(5) embellishments can be constructed that achieve the other members of X and merged 
with the original embellishment in such a way that s occurs between the root and 
target of every link that establishes one of these members of X. 
The defeater produced in this way is itself defeasible, being defeated by finding a proper 
subset X0 of X that satisfies (l), (4) and (5) but not (2). 
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We canimplementthis by replacing UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINKS and UNDERMINE- 
CAUSAL-LINK by the following triple of rules: 
COLLECTIVELY-UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINKS 
Givenaninferencein accordancewith SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL, ADD-ORDERING- 
CONSTRAINT, or CONFRONTATION to the conclusion thatplun & will achieve (Gt & G2)- 
at-t, adopt interest in establishing that plun & collectively undermines one of its own 
causal-links. If it is determined that it does collectively undermine one of its own causal- 
links, take the inference to the conclusion that plan & will achieve (G 1 & G&at-t to be 
defeated. 
UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINK 
Given an interest in establishing that plan& collectively undermines one of its own 
causal-links, for each causal-link n 1 + subgoal1 + . . . + subgoal,, -+ n2 + goal, + 
. . -_, goal,,, of plan&, adopt interest in finding an embellishment plan0 of plan& 
that achieves -subgoal1 between nt and n2 consistent with the ordering-constraints 
of plan &. Given plunO, infer nondefeasibly that plan & collectively undermines one of 
its own causal-links. 
COLLECTIVELY-UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINK 
Given an interest in establishing that plan& collectively undermines one of its own 
causal-links, for each causal-link nl + subgoal, -+ . . . + subgoal,, + n2 --+ goal, -+ 
. . . -+ goal, of plan&, adopt interest in finding a g and an embellishment plan0 of 
plan & such that (1) plan0 achieves -(subgoal, & g) between n I and n2 consistent with 
the ordering-constraints of plan&, and (2) there is an embellishment plan* of plan0 
that achieves g before some penultimate node of pluno. Given plan0 and plan*, infer 
nondefeasibly that plan & collectively undermines one of its own causal-links. 
Here g is ZI(X - (subgoal,)). The defeasibility of the defeat results from the defeasibility 
of the inference to the conclusion that plan* will achieve g. 
UNDERMINE-EMBEDDED-CAUSAL-LINKS and UNDERMINE-EMBEDDED-CAUSAL- 
LINK are replaced by an analogous triple of rules. 
There are two ways of repairing plans that collectively undermine some of their own 
causal-links: 
ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (gt & g2)-at-t, 
and plans plan, for gl-at-t and plan2 for g2-at-t, if plan& is a putative plan for 
(gt & g2)-at-t, constructed by merging plans plunl and plan, (and possibly other 
plans), but a plan-step n of plan& collectively undermines one of its own causal- 
links n 1 + subgoal1 -+ . . . -+ subgoal,, + n2 + goal, + . . . + goal, by collectively 
undermining a set of causal-links L, construct a plan plan+ by adding an ordering- 
constraint to the effect that that n not occur between the root and target of some member 
of C (if this can be done consistently) and infer defeasibly that plan+ will achieve 
(g1 & gzw-t. 
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CONFRONTATION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving a conjunctive goal (gt & g2)-at-t, 
and plans plan, for gl-at-t, and plan2 for g2-at-t, if plan& is a putative plan for 
(gl & gz)-at-t constructed by merging plans plan, and plan2 (and possibly other 
plans), but a plan-step n of plan& collectively undermines one of its own causal- 
links II 1 -+ subgoal1 -+ . . . -+ subgoal,, + n2 --+ goal1 + . . . -+ goal, by collectively 
undermining a set of causal-links L by virtue of there being an embellishment plan, 
that achieves P, where P is the negation of the initial subgoal of some member of C, 
then for each causal-link no --+ G 1 + . . . + G, -+ n + P of piano, adopt interest in 
finding a plan for achieving -G I. If a plan repair-plan is proposed for achieving -G 1, 
construct a new plan plan+ by adding to plan& the plan-steps, ordering-constraints, 
and causal-links of repair-plan, with the following exception. Replace each causal-link 
of the form n* + SGl --f . . . -+ SG, -+ *jinish* --f SG, in repair-plan by the causal- 
link n* + SG, + . . . -+ SG, --+ n -+ SG,, and order n* between no and n. If this 
ordering is consistent, infer defeasibly that plan+ will achieve (~1 & g2)-at-t. 
CONFRONTATION works by undermining the embellishment that collectively undermines 
the causal-link of the original plan. Note, however, that CONFRONTATION requires outright 
undermining, not collective undermining. Collective undermining would leave open the 
possibility that the embellishment will achieve its goal (and undermine the causal-link of 
the original plan) in some cases even if does not do so in all cases. 
Similar modifications are required to ADD-EMBEDDED-• RDERING-CONSTRAINT and 
EMBEDDED-CONFRONTATION. 
This set of rules for goal-regression planning is sound and complete, for the same reason 
the set of rules of Section 4 was sound and complete relative to (Rl). Thus we have 
successfully removed the syntactical constraints of Section 2. 
Implementation. With the exception of PLAN-FOR-IMPLICANS, the inference-schemes 
described above have been implemented in the OSCAR defeasible reasoner to produce 
an implemented defeasible planner. The implementation is straightforward using OS- 
CAR’s macro language for the construction of inference-schemes. For example, GOAL- 
REGRESSION is implemented by defining: 
(def-backwards-reason GOAL-REGRESSION 
:conclusions “(plan-for plan goal)” 
:condition (interest-variable plan) 
: backwards-premises 
“((precondition & action) => goal)” 
(:condition (temporally-projectible precondition)) 
“(plan-for subplan precondition new-goals nodes nodes-used links)” 
“(define plan (extend-plan action goal subplan))” 
(:condition (not (null plan))) 
:variables precondition action goal plan subplan) 
where EXTEND-PLAN is defined by a piece of LISP code. The details of this implementa- 
tion are described in a technical report [37], and both the technical report and the imple- 
mented planner can be downloaded from my website (http:Nwww.u.arizona.edu/-pollock). 
316 J. L. Pdlock /Arti$cial Intelligence IO6 (I 998) 267-334 
Simple extensions. Most planners are based on special-purpose inference engines 
dedicated exclusively to planning. The OSCAR planner is based instead on a general- 
purpose defeasible reasoner. The reasoner is applied to planning by providing it with 
reasoning-schemas that concern plans, but the structure of the reasoner itself remains 
unchanged. A simple illustration of this is that the planning rules need not mention 
unification or variable binding, because that is all handled automatically by the defeasible 
reasoner. One of the consequences of this approach is that we can represent causal 
information about actions very simply in terms of conditionals, rather than adopting 
a special action representation language like STRIPS or ADL. This makes it easy for 
the OSCAR planner to combine reasoning about other matters with its planning, and 
it makes it easy to extend the planning rules to accommodate more complex planning 
considerations that are beyond the scope of most planners. The next three sections illustrate 
this by showing how the OSCAR planner can reason about concurrent actions, quantified 
preconditions and effects, domains in which objects are created and destroyed, and causal 
connections involving complex temporal relationships. 
9. Concurrent actions 
It is often observed that either the STRIPS or ADL representation of actions precludes 
the possibility of concurrent actions, because concurrent actions can conspire to produce 
“cooperative results” that are not results of the individual actions. Pednault [27] gives the 
example of lifting both sides of a table simultaneously, and Chapman [6] gives the example 
of pressing down on both sides of a Lego die. It is perhaps of interest that representing the 
results of actions instead in terms of planning-conditionals makes it quite easy to both 
describe the results of concurrent actions and construct plans that use those results. To 
accomplish this, we simply allow A in the planning-conditional (A/C) l G to be either 
an action or a conjunction of actions performed simultaneously. Then we can describe 
the cooperative results of concurrent actions by employing planning conditionals like ((lift 
right side of table at time t & E$t Left side of table at time t)ltable weighs less than 100 
pounds) w (table suspended above Jloor at time t*)). Where A and A* are conjunctions 
of actions, I will write A & A* iff every conjunct of A is a conjunct of A*. 40 Because 
planning-conditionals are nomic generalizations, if A 2 A* and (A/C) w G, it follows that 
(A*/ C) N G, so adding conjuncts can only give rise to new results-not conflicting results. 
To accommodate concurrent actions in our definition of expectable-result, we allow each 
Ai in an action-sequence to be either a single action or a conjunction of actions, and modify 
clauses (ii) and (iii) accordingly: 
(R7) Where start-state is a state of affairs, conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, 
and to < . < tn+l is a sequence of times, P-at-t,+1 is an expectable-result of 
(A 1 -at-t1 , . . . , A,-at-t,) relative to start-state and conditionals iff either: 
(i) n = 0, P is temporally-projectible, and P-at-to is true in start-state; or 
4” If A is not a coniunction, I take it to be its own only conjunct. 
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(ii) IZ > 0, P is temporally-projectible, and for some A,* C An, conditionals 
contains a conditional (AE/C) w P such that C-at-t,, is an expectable-result 
of (Al-at-tl,..., A,_l-ut-t,l_l) and tn+t > tn; or 
(iii) n > 0, P-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable-result of (Al-at-tl, . . , 
A,_, -at-t,_*), and if for some AZ C A,, conditionals contains a conditional 
of the form (A,/C) N -l7X such that C-at-t, is a temporally-projectible 
expectable-result of (A,-at-t], . .., A,_,-ut-t,_l), tn+l > tn, X is a set 
of temporally-projectible expectable-results of (A 1 -at-t] , . . , A,_ 1 -at-t,_ I), 
and P E X, then for some A,* C A,, conditionals contains a conditional 
(AZ/C*) k -l7X0 such that C*-at-t, is a temporally-projectible expectable- 
result of (Al-at-tl, . . . , A,,_)-at-t,,_l), X0 C X, and P # X0; or 
(iv) IZ > 0 and P-at-t,+* is a conjunction whose conjuncts are expectable-results 
of (Al-at-tl, . . , A,-at-c,); or 
(v) IZ > 0 and P-at-t,+1 is a logical consequence of some expectable-result of 
(Al-at-tl, . . . , A,-at-t,); or 
(vi) n > 0 and P-at-t,+, is known to be nomically implied by some expectable- 
result of (Al-at-tl, . . , AR-at-t,,). 
TO construct plans with this semantics, we record each conjunct of a conjunctive action 
in a separate plan-node (but all with the same time reference). Then we modify GOAL- 
REGRESSION as follows: 
GOAL-REGRESSION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving G-at-t, if G is temporally-projectible, 
adopt interest in finding planning-conditionals (A/C) N G having G as their consequent. 
Given such a conditional, adopt an interest in finding a plan for achieving C-at-t*. If it 
is concluded that a plan subplan will achieve C-at-t*, construct a plan by 
(1) adding new steps to the end of subplun where each new step prescribes an action 
Ai-at-t* where Ai is a conjunct of A, 
(2) adding the constraint (t* < t) to the ordering-constraints of subplan, and 
(3) adjusting the causal-links appropriately. Infer defeasibly that the new plan will 
achieve G-at-t. 
EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION must be modified similarly. Only one other change 
required. In ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT, the requirement that the time t of the 
undermining step not occur between the times tl and t2 of the root and target of the 
undermined causal-link was previously taken to mean that either t -c tI or t2 -c t. Given 
the possibility of concurrent actions, it must mean instead that either t < rl or t2 < t. 
10. Quantifiers, creation and destruction 
The preconditions and consequents of planning-conditionals often involve quantihca- 
tion. A standard example [45] is that a precondition for putting block A on block B is that 
there isn’t already a block on block B. Thus in order to put block A on block B, if block C 
is already on block B, GOAL-REGRESSION will lead us to try to find a plan for removing 
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it. There are two radically different ways of doing this. We might put block C elsewhere, 
or we might zap it with a block-destroying ray gun. 
ADL makes the assumption that nothing is created or destroyed in the course of 
executing a plan, thus precluding the second way of solving the above planning problem 
[27, p. 691. Accordingly, the standard way of handling quantification in planning is 
to expand universally or existentially quantified formulas into finite conjunctions or 
disjunctions ranging over all the actual objects in the fixed planning domain [45]. 
Given the semantics for planning provided by (R7), there is no need to restrict planning 
problems to either fixed or finite domains. Let E!(x, t) mean “x exists at time t”. Then 
[(Vx)@]-at-t is taken to be equivalent to (Vx)[E!(x, t) > pat-t]. A planning-conditional 
governing putting one block on another is: 
(put A on B at t/-(3x)(x on B)-at-t) l (A on B at t*). 
The goal of having A on B at time t will then produce the subgoal of having 
-(3x)(x on B)-at-q 
for some tt < r . Suppose that C is the only block on B at the start-time to: 
(Vx)[(x on B) ZE x = Cl-at-to. 
(10.3) logically entails 
(Vx)[(x OIZ B) > x = Cl-at-to. 
Assuming temporal-projectibility, we can infer defeasibly: 
(Vx)[(x OIZ B) > x = Cl-at-q. 
(10.5) conjoined with either 










logically entails (10.2). Thus PLAN-FOR-IMPLICANDA gives rise to (10.6) and (10.6*) 
as subgoals (conjoined with (10.5) which also becomes a subgoal but is achieved by 
PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN). We can achieve (10.6) by moving C to another location, or we 
can achieve (10.6*) by zapping C. 
This example illustrates that the expansion of quantified formulas into conjunctions and 
disjunctions can foil a planning problem by making solutions involving the creation or 
destruction of objects unavailable. But sometimes the expansion seems to be intuitively 
correct. If my goal is to have all the lights in the room turned on, it would be perverse to 
try to achieve this by either removing all the lights from the room or destroying them. The 
problem is that the English formulation of the goal as “make it the case that all of the lights 
in the room are turned on” is ambiguous between “make it that case that (Vx) (X is a light in 
the room at t > x is turned on at r)” and “make it the case that (Vx)(x is a light in the room 
at to > x is turned on at t)“. The former goal can be achieved by removing or destroying 
lights, but the latter goal can only be achieved by turning on all the lights currently in the 
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room. However, none of this is a problem for the OSCAR planning system as long as the 
goal is formulated precisely to distinguish between these two readings. 
It is worth noting that the expansion of quantified formulas assumes a finite domain. 
But there is no finiteness requirement for planning with quantified formulas in the OSCAR 
system of planning. The above example did assume that there are only finitely many things 
on B, but that is just a feature of that particular example. If instead there were infinitely 
many blocks on B, but we had a block-zapper that would simultaneously destroy all the 
blocks atop a given block, then we could solve the planning problem even more simply and 
without using (10.4). 
11. Accommodating complex temporal relationships 
Most current planners employ a STRIPS or ADL representation of actions. As Pednault 
[27] shows, ADL is expressively equivalent to the situation calculus [25]. In particular, 
time is represented by discrete time points. Throughout this paper I have been implicitly 
assuming metric time, times being represented by real numbers, but none of the planning 
rules formulated so far in this paper turn upon that, because all ‘N’ requires is a 
simple ordering of times. However, I remarked at the end of Section 5 that the causal 
connections between actions, preconditions, and effects, can involve more complex 
temporal relationships than those symbolized using ‘>‘. The example of serving a tennis 
ball illustrated the use of a nomic conditional of the form 
{ (A*-at-t & SG-at-t + a) =+ (36)G-throughout-(t + E, t + E + S]}, 
where the time of the action is the time at which it begins. More generally, the causal 
reasoning involved in planning can employ conditionals of the form 
((A*-at-t & (SGI-throughout-[t +a~, t +j+] &...& 
SG,-throughout-[t + (Y,, t + pm])) 
=+ (36)G-throughout-(t + F, t + 6 + 61). 
I will abbreviate this as (A/SGl, . . . , SGd +&.(a ,...., a,),(p ,...., pm) G, or more simply as 
(AI=) ‘E&b G where SG, CZ!, and ,L?I are finite sequences. If j3 is a sequence of zeros, I 
will omit it. If cx is a sequence of zeros as well, I will omit both. If E = 0 too, I will omit 
all three subscripts. It is of interest to see how these more complex planning-conditionals 
can be used in planning, and to show that they present no serious obstacle to the OSCAR 
planner. 
We must generalize our semantics to accommodate the use of these conditionals. That 
semantics proceeds in terms of the concept of an expectable-result, but that can no longer 
be defined using the kind of definition exemplified by (R2)-(R7) which recourses on the 
sequence of actions. The problem is that time delays in causation may result in action 
A,_, -at-t,_1 making P true, but only after t,,. We can instead define the expectable- 
interval over which P can be defeasibly expected to be true as a result of performing the 
actions in the sequence. Even this is complicated, because there can be multiple planning- 
conditionals appealing to a single action, with the result that the single action can first 
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make P true and later make it false. For example, eating dinner early may make me not 
hungry an hour from now but hungry again 3 hours from now. To handle all of this we 
consider the sequence of all times at which the expectable-intervals may change as a result 
of something happening, and define the expectable-intervals recursively on the basis of that 
sequence. This sequence of times is characterized as follows: 
Given a set of planning-conditionals conditionals, an action-sequence (A 1 -at-t1 ,
. ..( A,-at-t,,), and a starting-time to, the sequence of associated-times consists of 
to together with all times ti + E such that 1 < i < n and conditionals contains some 
conditional (Ai /C) N~.~,B P. The sequence of associated-times is ordered by ‘ 6 ’ . 
(W Where conditionals is a set of planning-conditionals, to -c . . -c tn+l is a sequence 
of times, and (Al-at-tl, . . . , An-at-t,,) is an action-sequence, let (to, , rk) be the 
sequence of associated times. For each temporally-projectible P, the expectuble- 
interval Z( P, (to, . . , ti)) is defined recursively as follows: 
if P-at-to is true, 
otherwise, 
ifi >O 
zO(P, (TO> . ‘3 ri)) 
’ I(P, (to, . . ti-1)) U (r;, 00) if for some AZ C A,, conditionals 
contains a conditional (AZ/C) •E.(I,~ P such that for each Ci in C, 
[ti+LYi-&E,~i+Bi-El~Z(Cj,(tO,...,~i-_l)); 
I(P, (TO,. . , Tii-I)) - (ti, ~0) if for some AX C A,, conditionals 
= 
contains a conditional (AZ/C) w~,~,J -l7X such that for each Cj in C, 
[ti+~i-E,ri++i-E]EZ(Cj,(to ,..., ri_])), PEX, and 
there is no A,+ c A, such that conditionals contains a conditional 
(AZ/C*) •J,~,A -l7Xa such that for each CT in C*, 
[ti + yi - 8, ri + h; - 61 C Z(CT, (ro, . . , r;_t)), Xo s X, and P 6 X0; 
< Z(P, (to,. . , Ti _ I)) otherwise. 
Z(P, (to, . ., ri )I 
=u(nc &(Q, (re, . , ti)) 1 Q E X} 1 I7X is known to nomically imply P I 
P-at-t is an expectable-result of (A 1 -at-t1 , . . , An-at-t,) iff t E Z( P, (to, . . . , ti)). 
P-throughout-[t, t*] isanexpectuble-resultof (Al-at-t], . . , An-at-t,) iff [t, t*] s 
z(P, (50,. . , ti)). 
To explain, there are three ways the expectable-interval for P can be altered at ri. First, 
there may be a conditional (A,*/(T) •E,(Y,~ P that makes P expectably true from ri forwards. 
This results in our adding (ri , co) to the previous expectable-interval Z( P, (to, . . , zi- I)). 
Second, there may be a conditional (AZ/C) •F,OI,~ -l7X making P no longer expectably 
true from ri forwards. This results in our deleting the times in (ti , CO) from the previous 
expectable-interval Z( P, (~0, . , s;-1 )). I assume that these first two cases are mutually 
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exclusive. There cannot be true causal connections resulting in P and -P both being 
caused at the same time. Zo(P, (TO, . , ti)) is the expectable-interval that results directly 
from planning-conditionals governing P. However, P can also be made expectably true 
by being nomically implied by by other expectably true propositions. Given any set 
X of propositions that are known to jointly nomically imply P, P is expectably true 
whenever all members of X are expectably true. So I( P, (to, . . . , ti)) must include 
nczo(Q, (to,. . , i t )) I Q E X). This holds for every set X of propositions that are 
known to jointly nomically imply P, so we take Z( P, (~0, . , t;)) to be the union of all 
such intersections. Note that because IT{ P} nomically implies P, Zo(P, (to, . . . , xi)) 2 
Z(P, (TO, , ti)). Furthermore, if there are no planning-conditionals directly affecting P, 
Zo(P, (to, . f. 1 Ti)) =Z(P, (to. . . . . s;-I)). 
so 
z(Pt (W,. ., ti-1)) C z(P, (TO, .* ri)). 
To illustrate this complex definition with a simple example, suppose Ct and C4 are true 
at the starting time to, and suppose we have the planning-conditionals (Al/Cl) w~,,~, C2, 
(A2/C2) ‘e2,0rz c3, (A2/C4) ‘q,q +Zj. Suppose actions A 1 and A2 are performed at 
times tt and t2, where to < tl < tl + 011 < tl + ~1 < t2 < t2 + ~22 < t2 + ~2 c t2 + a3 < 
t:!+&g.Thentheassociatedtimesarero=to.tl =tl +~l,t2=t2+~2,andt3=t2+~3. 
The expectable-intervals then evolve as follows: 







Expectable-intervals relative to (to, 51): 
A1 






322 J.L. Pdock /Arti$cial Intelligence 106 (1998) 267-334 
Expectable-intervals relative to (to, tl, ~2): 
A1 A2 
to t1 t1 +cr1 t] +&I t2 t2+c!2 t2+&2 
to Tl t2 
Cl [~O........................................................................~ ) 
c2 (q.. ...................................................... ..oo) 
C3 (q ........................................ cm) 
c4 [ro........................................................................~ ) 
Expectable-intervals relative to (to, tl, ~2, ~3): 
Al A2 
to t1 tl + al t1 + El t2 t2 + %2 t2 + F2 t2 + a3 t2 + Ej 
TO Tl 52 tg 
Cl [TO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . .co) 
c2 (t1..........................................................00) 
C.1 (t2.. . . . . . . . ,531 
c4 [to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ca) 
NOW consider how this altered semantics affects the rules for planning. The changes are 
minor. First, the ordering-constraints imposed by GOAL-REGRESSION must be adjusted: 
GOAL-REGRESSION 
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving G-at-t, if G is temporally-projectible, 
adopt interest in finding planning-conditionals (A/C) w~,~.B G having G as their 
consequent. Given such a conditional, adopt an interest in finding a plan for achieving 
the conjunction of the Ci-at-ti’s for Ci in C (where each ti is a new variable). If it is 
concluded that a plan subplun will achieve the conjunction of the Ci -at-ti ‘s, construct a 
plan by 
(1) adding new steps to the end of subplun where each new step prescribes an action 
Aj-at-t* where Aj is a conjunct of A, 
(2) adding the constraint (t* +e -c t) and the constraints (ti -c t* +ai) to the ordering- 
constraints of subplan, and 
(3) adjusting the causal-links appropriately. Infer defeasibly that the new plan will 
achieve G-at-t. 
EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION must be modified similarly. 
The other changes required concern undermining causal-links. Consider a causal-link 
nl -+ subgod, + ... + subgoal,, + n2 + goal, + + goal, established using the 
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planning-conditionals (Al/subgoall) l E,(Y,~ goal, and (Az/goal,) WS.~,~ G. There will be 
a time-lag E between the time tt that ~11 is executed (A 1 is performed) and the achievement 
of subgoal,. Furthermore, subgoal1 will be required to remain true not just until the time 
t2 that n2 is executed (A2 is performed), but until t2 + A. E is the root-ofiet and k the 
target-offset of the causal-link. Let us record these offsets by rewriting the causal-link in 
the form n 1 -fg subgoal, -+ . -+ subgoal, + n2 +A. goal, + . . . + goal,,, . Then we 
revise UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINK and COLLECTIVELY-UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINK as 
follows: 
UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINK 
Given an interest in establishing that plan& collectively undermines one of its 
own causal-links, for each causal-link nl +E subgoal, -+ . + subgoal,, -+ n2 +A 
goal, -+ -+ goal,,, ofplan &, where tl is the time of IZ 1 and t2 is the time of n2, adopt 
interest in finding an embellishment plan0 of plan & that achieves -subgoal, between 
tl + E and t2 + h consistent with the ordering-constraints of plan &. Given planO, infer 
nondefeasibly that plan & collectively undermines one of its own causal-links. 
COLLECTIVELY-UNDERMINE-CAUSAL-LINK 
Given an interest in establishing that plan& collectively undermines one of its 
own causal-links, for each causal-link ~11 -+E subgoal, + . + subgoal, --+ n2 -+A 
goal1 + . . + goal, of plan &, where tl is the time of n 1 and t2 is the time of n2, 
adopt interest in finding a g and an embellishment plan0 of plan & such that (1) plan0 
achieves -(subgoal, & g) between tl + E and t2 + h consistent with the ordering- 
constraints of plan&, and (2) there is an embellishment plan* of plan0 that achieves 
g before some penultimate node of plaq. Given plan0 and plan*, infer nondefeasibly 
that plan & collectively undermines one of its own causal-links. 
UNDERMINE-EMBEDDED-CAUSAL-LINK and COLLECTIVELY-UNDERMINE-EMBEDDED- 
CAUSAL-LINK are modified analogously. The rules for finding embellishments must be 
modified in the obvious way to accommodate these slightly more complex ordering- 
constraints. The ordering-constraints added by ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT, CON- 
FRONTATION, ADD-EMBEDDED-• RDERING-CONSTRAINT, and EMBEDDED-CONFRON- 
TATION must also be modified in the obvious way to take account of the causal-link offsets. 
12. Conclusions 
Goal-regression planning is aimed at the construction of plans. In this paper I have 
adopted a certain conception of a plan, according to which a plan is identified with a 
quadruple consisting of a set of plan-steps, a set of ordering-constraints, a set of causal- 
links, and a goal. The definition (R6) of “expectable-result” constitutes a semantics, relative 
to which we can prove the soundness and completeness of the set of rules for goal- 
regression planning described in Section 8. This provides a secure logical foundation for 
goal-regression planning applicable to planning by autonomous rational agents in complex 
environments. 
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The theory of goal-regression planning developed in this paper draws heavily on 
conventional AI planning theory, but there are also important differences. One important 
difference is that the planner proposed here is not an r.e. planner. It has been argued 
that a planning agent embedded in a complex environment must interleave planning 
with epistemic cognition aimed at providing information needed for planning, and this 
makes r.e. planning logically impossible. Instead, planning must be done defeasibly. 
To accomplish this I have proposed taking goal-regression planning to be a species of 
epistemic cognition whose purpose is to generate defeasibly reasonable conclusions of the 
form “plan p would achieve its goal if the prescribed plan-steps were executed in any 
order consistent with its ordering-constraints”. A system that plans in this way has been 
implemented using the OSCAR system of defeasible reasoning. 
Viewing planning as an epistemic endeavor generates a different kind of semantical 
foundation for planning. The conventional approach adopts the definition (RI) of “result”, 
and then attempts to prove the soundness and completeness of a planning algorithm. This 
concept of “result” is intended to be an objective concept describing the way the world will 
be as a result of executing the plan. But once it is recognized that planning is based upon 
defeasible expectations rather than objectively determinate results of actions, it becomes 
apparent that no such definition of “result” is possible. The semantics of planning must 
instead be based upon the epistemic concept of an “expectable-result”. 
It has been argued here that goal-regression planning presupposes a certain kind of 
solution to the Frame Problem, and this generates the second important difference from 
conventional AI planning theory. The solution to the Frame Problem uses TEMPORAL- 
PROJECTION at crucial points in the process of inferring that a plan can be expected to 
achieve its goal, and that requires the imposition of temporal-projectibility constraints in 
the definition of “expectable-result” and on the subgoals generated by GOAL-REGRESSION 
and SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL. 
Conventional AI planning theory imposes syntactical constraints on goals and planning- 
conditionals that, upon reflection, seem unreasonable. Once these constraints are relaxed, 
it becomes apparent hat the definition (R2) of “expectable-result” is inadequate in various 
ways. The most obvious failure of (R2) is that the logical and nomic consequences of 
expectable-results are not automatically expectable-results. It also fails to accommodate 
collective undermining. Correcting these shortcomings leads to the final definition (R6). 
The system of defeasible goal-regression planning described in section eight and based 
upon (R6) has been implemented in the OSCAR planner, which is based upon the OSCAR 
system of defeasible reasoning. The resulting planner should, however, be viewed more as 
a proof of concept than as a serious attempt at building a practical planner. There has been 
no attempt to make it particularly efficient-just to make it work. Much of the research 
that has been directed at making classical planners more efficient is equally applicable to 
the OSCAR planner, and can in principle be applied to the prioritization of the reasoning 
underlying the plan search. However, that is a matter for further research. 
One feature of the OSCAR planner requires particular mention in this connection. 
“Standard’ partial order planners like SNLP and UCPOP produce partial plans as they 
regress backwards from the goal, and extend the partial plans by either adding new steps to 
achieve unachieved subgoals or adding steps or ordering-constraints to resolve threats. By 
contrast, the OSCAR planner produces only complete plans, starting with short complete 
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plans for subgoals and then extending them to build a complete plan for the final goal. 
Partial plans are, in effect, represented by the structure of epistemic interests produced in 
the course of the plan reasoning, but they are not actually constructed as entities to be 
reasoned about. A side effect of this is that the search for threats (or underminings) must 
be postponed until the plans are produced. There is much recent work on the issue of the 
order in which plan construction (i.e., adding plan-steps) and threat resolution should occur 
to make a planner efficient. Of particular importance is Pollack et al. [31] and Gerevini 
and Schubert [ 111. 41 Both papers produce substantial empirical evidence suggesting that 
it many cases it is best to postpone threat resolution until plan construction is otherwise 
complete. In explaining this, Gerevini and Schubert observe (and Pollack et al. concur) 
that many threats will disappear during the course of planning as new ordering constraints 
and variable bindings are adopted, and so planning effort is saved by ignoring them until 
we know that they will not disappear. Note that this is also an argument for postponing 
threat resolution until we know that a threat is real, i.e., an undermining, which is just what 
the OSCAR planner does. So it is unclear whether this feature of the OSCAR planner is an 
advantage or a deficit. This is also matter for further research. 
A planning system that constructs plans by reasoning about them defeasibly will 
of necessity run more slowly than an r.e. planner because of the greater overhead of 
the defeasible reasoner. In light of these “built-in inefficiencies”, I expect there to be 
considerable resistance to the proposal that we should base planners on the semantics 
provided by (R6) rather than the more traditional semantics provided by (Rl). Traditional 
AI planning researchers may insist that classical planning algorithms provide an efficient 
solution to the planning problem, and my proposed changes undermine that inefficiency. 
The proper answer to this objection is that classical planning algorithms provide an 
efficient solution to a different problem. In an applied planning situation in which (1) all 
of the relevant factual knowledge can be compiled-in from the start, (2) temporal- 
projectibility problems can be avoided by carefully tailoring the formalism to avoid 
expressing temporally-unprojectible propositions, and (3) the syntactical constraints can 
be satisfied by careful tailoring of the formalism, then classical planning algorithms are a 
better solution than a defeasible planner based upon (R6). (R6) and the defeasible planner 
based upon it are instead solutions to two ot‘her problems. The first is the theoretical 
problem of understanding the logic of goal-reduction planning in its full generality. 
Classical planning algorithms based upon (R2) cannot provide such an understanding. 
The second is the problem of building a truly autonomous planning agent that can deal 
with a complex and unpredictable environment. For such an agent, assumptions (l)-(3) are 
indefensible. If we want such an agent to behave rationally in an uncooperative world, it 
must be based upon (R6) and engage in defeasible planning. Classical planning algorithms 
are inapplicable. 
There has been much recent excitement about two new “non-traditional” planners- 
Graphplan [3,41 and SATPLAN [201. On many problems, these planners dramatically 
outperform traditional planners like UCPOP and PRODIGY, and they appear to do so 
without using classical planning ideas like goal regression and threat-resolution. Does this 
4’ See also Peat and Smith [301, Joslin and Pollack [17], Srinivasan and Howe [42], and Williamson and Hanks 
[4f51. 
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threaten to make the classical ideas irrelevant? I don’t think so, for at least two reasons. 
First, it is not clear why Graphplan and SATPLAN perform so well. For example, Brafman 
et al. [5] provide evidence that the success of SATPLAN is attributable more to its use 
of stochastic search than to the propositional encoding that makes it part company from 
classical planning ideas. They construct a hybrid planner LSPS that combines classical 
planning ideas with stochastic search and find that in many cases it outperforms SATPLAN. 
Second, Graphplan and SATPLAN make essential use of the assumption that we have 
complete knowledge of the planning domain, including knowledge of all existent objects 
and all effects of actions. The planners literally cannot function without that assumption, 
but that assumption is unreasonable for an autonomous agent operating in a complex 
environment. So these planners may prove very useful for applied planning problems 
in well controlled domains, but unable to provide the planning resources required by an 
autonomous rational agent. 
The definition (R6) makes it possible to provide a firm logical foundation for goal- 
regression planning in autonomous agents. However, this work all presupposes the concept 
of a plan described above. This concept does not capture all of our planning endeavors. 
First, and most obviously, planning as discussed in this paper is restricted to “causal 
planning”, wherein the connections between actions and the goals and subgoals they aim at 
achieving is a causal one. Such causal connections are expressed by nomic generalizations. 
This is a very strict notion of a causal connection. It can reasonably be objected that human 
planning agents are rarely in a position of knowing the nomic generalizations that underlie 
the causal connections they employ in planning. For example, suppose I plan to start a fire 
by striking a match and holding the lit match under some kindling. One causal connection 
I am relying upon in this plan is that between striking a match and its lighting. I know of 
certain conditions that are required for the match to light-the match must be dry, there 
must be sufficient oxygen, it must not be too windy, etc. But I cannot enumerate a complete 
list of conditions sufficient to nomically imply that the match will light when struck. This 
may seem to constitute a serious logical obstacle to applying the planning rules formulated 
above, but fortunately, it is not. Although 1 cannot fill out the list of conditions, I am 
confident that there is a condition C (possibly a long conjunction) which (1) when added 
to the conditions I know will generate a true planning-conditional, and (2) C describes 
conditions that actually hold, and are very general “background conditions” of a sort that 
can be expected to hold in virtually any case in which we try to light a match by striking it. 
Thus, even without knowing what C is, we can take it to be established by a null-plan, and 
we can assume that it is not undermined by subsequent plan-steps. This means, in effect, 
that C can be safely ignored in planning. 
In causal planning, the plan is not guaranteed to achieve its goal, because TEMPORAL- 
PROJECTION is defeasible. But it is guaranteed to achieve its goal if the temporal 
projections do not fail. In this sense, the causal structure is guaranteed to be correct, 
although presupposed persistences may fail. In this respect, causal planning contrasts with 
probabilistic planning, in which the connection between the actions and their effects are 
probabilistic rather causal. Perhaps most cases of probabilistic planning can be reduced to 
cases in which there are nomic generalizations as above, but the condition C is not known 
to be true. All we know is that C has a certain probability of being true, and that probability 
may change in light of the execution of some of the plan-steps. Probabilistic planning is 
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a complicated matter, 42 but sometimes it is unavoidable. We sometimes find ourselves 
in situations in which we must plan, but lack the kind of causal knowledge required for 
causal planning. However, the investigation of such probabilistic goal-regression planning 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The theory of goal-regression planning developed here has some more mundane 
shortcomings as well. This is most easily seen by reconsidering the role of disjunctions 
in planning. Once the syntactical constraints of Section 2 were relaxed, the possibility of 
planning-conditionals with disjunctive consequents made everything more complicated by 
introducing the possibility of collective undermining. Section 8 showed how to construct 
rules for goal-regression planning that accommodate collective undermining. However, 
the rules of Section 8 still fall short of constituting a complete theory of goal-regression 
planning. Those rules are complete for plans as thus far defined, but planning-conditionals 
with disjunctive consequents reveal an inadequacy in our concept of a plan. 
It is useful to think briefly about the source of disjunctive consequents. There seem 
to be two ways in which planning-conditionals with disjunctive consequents can arise. 
The most straightforward source of disjunctive consequents is disjunctive antecedents. 
It follows from the logic of nomic generalizations that if (A/P) N R and (A/Q) N S 
then [A/(P v Q)] N (R v S). Such planning-conditionals will normally have temporally- 
unprojectible preconditions, and hence will be useless in planning according to the rules of 
Section 8. 
Sometimes the indeterminacy indicated by a disjunctive consequent results instead from 
indeterminacy built into the action. Real agents (e.g., human beings) are limited in the 
precision with which they can perform actions. This limited precision can produce different 
consequences when the same action is repeated in essentially the same circumstances. For 
instance, think of throwing a tennis ball “straight up” over the net of a tennis court. We 
never really succeed in throwing it straight up, so sometimes the ball will land in one 
court and sometimes in the other court, and we cannot predict which. This can produce a 
planning-conditional with a disjunctive consequent even though there is no indeterminacy 
in the precondition. Such planning-conditionals can play a role in undermining proposed 
plans, but will be of limited use in planning in accordance with the rules of Section 8 
because their temporally-unprojectible consequents preclude their being strung together 
by GOAL-REGRESSION to produce a multi-step plan. 
However, in real goal-regression planning, planning-conditionals with disjunctive an- 
tecedents and consequents are not useless. Disjunctions are often accurate representations 
of our knowledge of the circumstances in which an action may be performed. We may not 
know which disjunct is or will be true, and we must be able to plan in the face of such 
ignorance. How can we make use of disjunctive information in planning? Suppose P, Q, 
and R are temporally-projectible, we know P to be true, our goal is G, and we have the 
planning conditionals (Al/P) b (Q v R). (AZ/Q) N G, and (Aj/R) N G. We know that if 
we perform A 1, either Q or R will result, but we cannot be sure which. We cannot plan 
by projecting (Q v R) forwards to the time we perform the next step of a plan, but what 
we can do is consider the two possible results of the first step separately. If A1 produces 
Q. we can project that forwards in time, perform A?, and thereby achieve G. If instead 
42 See. for example, BURIDAN, as described in Kushmerick et al. [Zll. 
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At produces R, we can project that forwards in time, perform A3, and thereby achieve 
G. We cannot be sure which disjunct will result from performing A 1, but we can plan for 
each contingency separately and then decide which subplan to execute when we see what 
actually happens as a result of performing A I. This is an example of contingency planning. 
Disjunctions are handled in contingency planning by planning separately for the possibil- 
ity of each disjunct and then letting the results of executing the initial steps of the plan 
determine what subsequent steps are executed. 43 
What distinguishes contingency planning is that plan-steps can have conditionality built 
into them, and they may “call” different subplans depending upon what conditions are 
satisfied. Such plans are logically more complicated than the simple plans produced by the 
planning system described in this paper. This illustrates that the theory of goal-regression 
planning developed here is only complete for the rather simple conception of plans it 
assumes. Specifically, such plans consist of a set of plan-steps, a set of ordering-constraints, 
a set of causal-links (expressing nomic connections), a goal, and nothing more. Enriching 
the concept of a plan to add additional logical structure will require further modifications 
to the theory of goal-regression planning. 
Appendix A. Proofs of theorems 
Lemma A.l. If a plan is causally-sound, so are its linearizations. 
Lemma A.2. If a linear plan is causally-sound, then it is sound. 
Proof. By induction on the length of a plan (i.e., the number of steps in the plan). 
Base case. If a null-plan is causally-sound then it is presumptively-sound, and then its 
goal is true in the start-state. Hence by clause (i) of the definition of “result”, its goal is a 
result of the null-sequence of actions. So the plan is sound. 
Induction case. Suppose the lemma holds for plans of length < n. Suppose plan is a plan 
of length n. Let s 1, . . . , s, be the plan-steps of plan, and goal its goal. Let C be the set of all 
causal-links of plan having goal as their final-goal and having *finish* as their target. For 
each L in C, if L is the causal-link Sk + gL + . . + goul+ *$nish* + goal, construct 
a linear-plan planL whose goal is gL, whose plan-steps are st , . . . , Sk, whose ordering- 
constraints are those of plan restricted to planL, and whose causal-links are those of plan 
restricted to *start*, ~1, . . . , Sk, together with the causal-link Sk -+ gL --f *jinish* -+ go. 
planL is presumptively-sound because plan is presumptively-sound and we have not 
removed any causal-links pertaining to the plan-steps of planL. The only linearization of 
planL is planL itself, so if planL contained a causal-link si -+ subgoal + . --+ sj -+ . . . 
undermined by one of its plan-steps ~1, sl would have to occur between .ri and Sj, and for 
some Q that is either -subgoal or the negation of a conjunct of subgoal, Q would be a 
result of the sequence of actions prescribed by s 1. . , s[ . But then so would also undermine 
this same causal-link in plan. By hypothesis, plan is causally-sound and hence does not 
4.1 For work on contingency planning, see Warren [44], Etzioni et al. 181. Peot and Smith 1291, Goldman and 
Boddy [ 131, and Pryor and Collins 1391. 
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undermine any of its own causal-links, so there can be no such undermining in L either. 
Therefore planL is causally-sound. 
If k < n, it follows by the induction hypothesis that planL is sound and hence go is a 
result of the sequence of actions prescribed by ~1, , Sk. By hypothesis, the causal-link 
Sk + gL +’ . . -+ goal + *finish* -+ goal is not undermined by plan, so by clause (ii) of 
the definition of “result”, go is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by $1, . , s,, 
For at least one L in ,!Z, k = n. In that case, as plan is presumptively-sound, it has a 
causal-link of the form s -+ sg, -+ . . + sgl + s,, -+ gL + . -+ goal. As above, we 
can construct a plan of length < n for sgl, and as its causal-links are not undermined by 
plan, sgt is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by s) , . . . , s,. Then by clause 
(ii) of the definition of “result”, gL is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by 
si....,sn. 
Thus all of the gL (for L in C) are results of the sequence of actions prescribed by 
st , . , sn. goal is either the only gL (if there is just one) or the conjunction of the gL’s. In 
the former case goal is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by sr , . . s,, and in 
the latter case, by clause (iv) of the definition of “result”, goal is a result of the sequence 
of actions prescribed by si , . . , s,. Hence plan is sound. q 
Theorem 1. If a plan is causally-sound then it is sound. 
Proof. Suppose plan is causally-sound. By Lemma A.l, all of its linearizations are 
causally-sound. By Lemma A.2, all of its linearizations are sound. So by the definition 
of soundness for partial-order plans, plan is sound. [? 
Theorem 2. If a goal is a result of an action-sequence (Al, . . , A,), then there is a 
causally-sound plan for that goal some linearization of which prescribes the actions 
Al,...,A, inthatorder 
Proof. By induction on the length of the action sequence. Just let the plan be linear, and 
put in causal-links each time a planning-conditional is used to get a result. IJ 
Theorem 3. A plan-step n of a plan undermines a causal-link n 1 -+ subgoal1 + . . . + 
subgoal,, -+ n:! + goal1 -+ .. -+ goal, of plan i# there is a presumptively-sound 
embellishment plan0 of plan whose goal is either -subgoal, or the negation of a conjunct 
of subgoalI, and 
( 1) n is the single penultimate plan-step of plaq,, 
(2) there is a linearization of plan consistent with the ordering imposed by plan0 in 
which n occurs between n 1 and n2, and 
(3) plan0 is sound. 
Proof. From right-to-left is immediate by clause (iii) of (Rl). Conversely, suppose n 
undermines nl -+ subgoal1 + . .. + subgoal,, -+ n2 -+ goal, + . .. + goal,. By 
definition, there is a linearization of plan in which n occurs between n1 and n2 and -g 
is a result of the sequence of actions prescribed by the plan-steps *start*, . . . , n in the 
linearization, where g is either subgoal, or a conjunct of subgoal,. By Theorem 2, there is a 
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/ C ----)l.AdG* 
k -G -(-G&G*) 
Fig. A. 1. Test plan 
causally-sound plan for -g having start*, . , n as a linearization. Let plan0 be the result of 
adding the rest of the steps of plan to the end of that linearization, in the order prescribed by 
plan. Those additional steps succeed 12 and so are not relevant to the soundness. Hence by 
Theorem 1, plan0 is sound, and by the definition of causal-soundness it is presumptively- 
sound. u 
Theorem 4. A plan-step n of a plan undermines a causal-link n 1 -+ subgoal1 + . . -+ 
subgoal,, --+ n2 -+ goal, -+ .. + goal,,, of plan iff there is a presumptively-sound 
embellishment plan0 of plan whose goal is either -subgoal, or the negation of a conjunct 
of subgoalI, and 
(1) n is the single penultimate plan-step of plan,,, 
(2) there is a linearization of plan consistent with the ordering imposed by plan0 in 
which n occurs between n 1 and n2, and 
(3) plan0 does not undermine any of its own causal-links. 
Proof. From left-to-right, if plan0 is sound, by Theorem 2 it has a causally-sound 
linearization, so replace plan0 by that linearization. From right-to-left, if plan0 does not 
undermine any of its causal-links and it is presumptively-sound then it is causally-sound, 
so by Theorem 1 it is sound. q 
Theorem 5. If the set of planning-conditionals is re. but not recursive, then the set of 
sound solution-pairs (problem, solution) is not re. 
Proof. Suppose the set of planning-conditionals is r.e. and the set of (problem, solution) 
pairs is r.e. It will be shown that that it is then decidable whether a planning conditional 
(C/A) l G is in the set of planning-conditionals, and hence that set is recursive. To decide 
this, construct a planning problem by letting the start state consist of (C, -G} and taking 
the goal to be (-G & G*), and add the conditional (C/A) l G* to the set of planning- 
conditionals. The resulting set of planning-conditionals is still ce. but not recursive unless 
the original set was recursive. Consider the test plan diagrammed in Fig. A.l. This plan 
is a solution to the planning problem iff plan-step 1 does not undermine the causal-link 
*start* + -G + (WC & G*) + *finish*, which in turn holds iff (C/A) w G is not in 
the set of planning-conditionals. Thus if the set of (problem, solution) pairs is r.e., we 
can discover that (C/A) l G is not in the set of planning-conditionals by running an 
algorithm generating the (problem, solution) pairs and waiting and seeing that the above 
plan is produced for this planning problem. Thus the complement of the set of planning- 
conditionals is r.e. By assumption, the set of planning-conditionals is r.e., so it follows that 
the set of planning-conditionals is recursive. q 
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Let us say that a presumptively-sound plan is minimal iff the removal of any causal-links 
or ordering-constraints will render it no longer presumptively-sound. Minimal causally- 
sound plans are defined analogously. The following three lemmas are obvious: 
Lemma A.3. OSCAR canjnd any minimal presumptively-sound plan by repeated uses of 
PROPOSE-NULL-PLAN,GOAL-REDUCTION, and SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL. 
Lemma A.4 OSCAR canjnd any minimal presumptively-sound embellishment by repeat- 
ed-uses of EMBEDDED-NULL-PLAN, EMBEDDED-GOAL-REGRESSION, and SPLIT-EM- 
BEDDED-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL. 
Lemma A.5 OSCAR returns only presumptively-soundplans. 
Theorem 6. If OSCAR searches the space of potential inferences systematically then the 
OSCAR planner is sound. 
Proof. Let the proof-repair-depth of a plan returned by the OSCAR planner be the number 
of undermining embellishments that OSCAR finds and repairs in the course of constructing 
the plan. We prove by induction on the proof-repair-depth of a plan that if OSCAR returns 
it then it is sound. 
Suppose OSCAR returns a plan of proof-repair-depth 0. By Lemma A.5 it is presumpti- 
vely-sound. By Lemma A.4, there are no undermining embellishments, and so by Theorem 
1 the plan is sound. 
Suppose the theorem holds for all plans of proof-repair-depth < n, and OSCAR returns 
a plan of proof-repair-depth n + 1. By Lemma AS, it is presumptively-sound. If it is 
not sound, by Theorem 1, there must be a minimal undermining-embellishment. The 
embellishment is presumptively-sound, so by Lemma A.4 OSCAR will find it and try to 
repair it. The only way the plan can fail to be sound is if the repair is unsuccessful, i.e., 
OSCAR constructs an unsound repair plan. But the proof-repair-depth of the repair-plan 
will be < n, so by the induction hypothesis, it cannot be unsound. Thus the plan must be 
sound. q 
Theorem 7. If OSCAR searches the space of potential inferences systematically then the 
OSCAR planner is complete. 
Proof. A minimal causally-sound plan contains a minimal presumptively-sound plan 
for the same goal. The causally-sound plan can then be generated from the minimal 
presumptively-sound plan by finding causal-underminings and repairing them. The re- 
pairs in question are either repairs to the presumptively-sound plan itself or repairs 
to repair-plans used to repair the presumptively-sound plan. Consider the set of all 
plans generated in this way, starting with the minimal presumptively-sound plan and 
ending with the minimal causally-sound plan, including the undermining embellish- 
ments, the repair-plans and their repair-plans, etc. For any plan in this set, define the 
semantical-repair-depth of the plan to be the minimal number of causal-underminings 
that must be repaired in constructing it out of the presumptively-sound plan. Then we 
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prove by induction on the semantical-repair-depth that unless OSCAR’s search termi- 
nates earlier by finding a different causally-sound plan for that goal, for every num- 
ber II less than or equal to the semantical-repair-depth of the causally-sound plan, 
by repeated application of ADD-ORDERING-CONSTRAINT, CONFRONTATION, ADD- 
EMBEDDED-• RDERING-CONSTRAINT, and EMBEDDED-CONFRONTATION, OSCARwill 
find every plan in the set with semantical-repair-depth IZ, along with any undermining em- 
bellishments. 
The only plan in the set with semantical-repair-depth 0 is the minimal presumptively- 
sound plan, and by Lemma A.3, OSCAR can find it. 
Suppose the theorem holds for all plans in the set of semantical-repair-depth < n, and 
consider a plan of semantical-repair-depth n + 1. This plan is constructed by repairing 
a subplan of semantical-repair-depth n, either by adding an ordering-constraint so that 
the undermining embellishment of the subplan is not an embellishment of the plan or by 
adding a repair-plan that undermines the undermining embellishment. By the induction 
hypothesis, OSCAR can find the undermined subplan, the undermining embellishment, 
and the repair-plan, so OSCAR can find the plan of semantical-repair-depth n + 1. 
It follows that OSCAR can find any minimal causally-sound plan regardless of its 
semantical-repair-depth. If there is a sound plan for the goal, by Theorem 2 there is 
a causally-sound plan, and then there is a minimal causally-sound plan. So OSCAR is 
complete. 0 
Theorem 8. A plan plan collectively undermines its causal-link L iff there is an 
embellishment plan+ of plan and a set L of causal-links of plan+ such that plan+ 
presumptively-undermines L, and 
(1) LEL, 
(2) plan+ is causally-sound, and 
(3) there is no embellishment plan0 of plan+ and set C* of causal-links of plan+ such 
that 
(a) plan0 presumptively-undermines L*, 
(b) C* C C, 
(c) L $ C”, and 
(d) plan0 is causally-sound. 
Proof. Analogous to Theorem 2. 0 
Theorem 9. A plan plan collectively undermines its causal-link L iff there is a presumptiv- 
ely-sound embellishment plan+ of plan and a set C of causal-links of plan+ such that 
plan+ presumptively-undermines C, and 
(1) L EL, 
(2) there is no presumptively-sound embellishment plan0 ofplan+ and set C* of cuusal- 
links of plan+ such that 
(a) plan0 presumptively-undermines C*, 
(b) C* C Cc, 
(c) L 6 L*, and 
(d) plan0 does not collectively-undermine any of its causal-links. 
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Proof. Analogous to Theorem 3. q 
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